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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued twenty-six 
precedential opinions in 2009 in the field of government contracts, 
which includes appeals from the Boards of Contract Appeals  
(“the Boards”), the United States Court of Federal Claims (COFC) in 
disputes subject to the Contract Disputes Act (CDA),1 and appeals 
                                                 
 1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(3), (10) (2006) (providing for appellate review of 
COFC and Board of Contract Appeals decisions in the Federal Circuit); id.  
§ 1491(a)(2) (“The Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render 
judgment upon any claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor . . . including a 
dispute concerning termination of a contract, rights in tangible or intangible 
property, compliance with cost accounting standards, and other nonmonetary 
disputes . . . .”); 41 U.S.C. § 607(d), (g)(1)(A) (2006) (granting jurisdiction over 
contract disputes to the Boards of Contract Appeals and providing for appellate 
review of Board decisions in the Federal Circuit); § 609(a) (granting jurisdiction over 
contract disputes to the COFC).  
  
2010] 2009 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS 993 
from the COFC in bid protests and non-CDA contract disputes.2  
Although government contracts decisions continue to represent a 
relatively small portion of the Federal Circuit’s case law,3 the opinions 
issued in 2009 reflect significant developments in the court’s 
government contracts jurisprudence.   
Practitioners in this field should note four aspects of the 2009 
decisions in particular.  First, the Federal Circuit issued a host of 
significant bid protest decisions last year.  The seven precedential 
opinions issued in 2009 substantially exceed the law generated in this 
area in any of the previous five years (during which the court issued 
one precedential bid protest opinion in 2008,4 three in 2007,5 one in 
2006,6 four in 2005,7 and three in 20048).  More importantly, the 
court’s decision in each of these appeals favored the Government 
and emphasized the need for judicial restraint and deference to 
procuring officials.  In four appeals, the Federal Circuit reversed  
(at least in part) a trial court’s decision in favor of the protester, and 
in three of these reversals, the court expressed concern that the trial 
court had exceeded the scope of its review.  In Weeks Marine, Inc. v. 
                                                 
 2. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(3), 1491(a)(2), 1491(b)(1) (2006) (vesting the 
Federal Circuit with appellate review of “an action by an interested party objecting to 
a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to 
a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or 
regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement”). 
 3. These decisions account for ten percent of the precedential opinions issued 
by the Federal Circuit in 2009.  United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, Opinions & Orders, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/dailylog.html (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2010). 
 4. See Sheryl L. Floyd et al., 2008 Government Contract Law Decisions of the Federal 
Circuit, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (2009) (discussing Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of 
Defense, 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  
 5. See Hon. Mary Ellen Coster Williams, 2007 Government Contract Decisions of the 
Federal Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1088 (2008) (discussing Chapman Law Firm 
Co. v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934 (Fed. Cir. 2007), Blue & Gold Fleet v. 
United States, 492 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Avtel Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
501 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).  
 6. See David W. Burgett et al., 2006 Government Contract Decisions of the Federal 
Circuit, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1073, 1106 (2007) (discussing Rex Serv. Corp. v. United 
States, 448 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).  
 7. See Robert E. Korroch et al., 2005 Year in Review:  Analysis of Significant Federal 
Circuit Government Contracts Decisions, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 581, 612 (2006) (discussing 
Rice Servs. v. United States, 405 F.3d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2005), Bannum, Inc. v. United 
States, 404 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005), Kentucky v. United States, 424 F.3d 1222  
(Fed. Cir. 2005), and Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Defense, 413 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 8. See David Robbins, 2004 Government Contract Decisions of the Federal Circuit,  
54 AM. U. L. REV. 1205, 1222 (2005) (discussing PGBA, LLC v. United States, 389 
F.3d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2004), Banknote Corp. of Am. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), and NVT Techs., Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)).   
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United States,9 the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s judgment in 
favor of the protester, concluding that if it were to find that the 
agency lacked a rational basis for its decision, it “would be second-
guessing the Corps’s action,” which the court is “not permitted to 
do.”10  Similarly, in Alabama Aircraft Industries v. United States,11 the 
Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s judgment against the 
Government, concluding that the COFC’s ruling effectively 
“introduce[d] new requirements outside the scope of the RFP” and 
exceeded the scope of the trial court’s review.12  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, the Federal Circuit in Axiom Resource Management, 
Inc. v. United States,13 reiterated that the COFC’s review of bid protests 
under the Tucker Act is limited to the administrative record and 
admonished that “supplementation of the record should be limited 
to cases in which ‘the omission of extra-record evidence precludes 
effective judicial review.’”14 
Axiom, in particular, will lead to further litigation over (1) what 
constitutes “effective judicial review,” (2) what sort of extra-record 
evidence may be “necessary” to provide such review if the record is 
inadequate, and (3) how much discretion the COFC has to decide 
these issues.  Nevertheless, the unmistakable theme of the Federal 
Circuit’s 2009 bid protest decisions is the court’s focus on the limits 
of judicial review of federal procurement decisions.   
Second, the Federal Circuit upheld one of the largest judgments 
ever reported against a contractor under the anti-fraud provision of 
the CDA in Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co. v. United States.15  
The decision in Daewoo is important not only for the size of the 
judgment levied against the contractor for submitting a fraudulent 
claim, but also because the line drawn between the amount of the 
claim that was fraudulent and the amount that was not fraudulent 
continues to raise more questions than it answers.  Given the ever-
increasing focus on allegations of contractor fraud in the media, 
Congress, and the Executive Branch, Daewoo underscores the stakes 
involved in such allegations and deserves an especially close reading 
by all members of the government contracts bar. 
                                                 
 9. 575 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 10. Id. at 1371. 
 11. 586 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 12. Id. at 1376. 
 13. 564 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 14. Id. at 1380 (quoting Murakami v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 731, 735 (2000), 
aff’d, 398 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 15. 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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Third, the Federal Circuit continued to decide questions of 
contract interpretation according to its view of the “plain meaning” 
of the contract language at issue, in some cases concluding that this 
plain meaning had eluded the lower tribunal.  The most significant 
of these decisions is Bell BCI Co. v. United States,16 in which a divided 
panel of the court ruled that boilerplate release language in a 
bilateral modification barred a contractor’s claims for the cumulative 
and disruptive impact of multiple change orders.17  Over a vigorous 
dissent,18 the panel majority held that the release language 
unambiguously discharged claims for cumulative impact and 
disruption, notwithstanding the absence of any reference to 
“cumulative impact” or “disruption” in the modification and the 
Government’s failure to introduce any evidence that the parties 
intended to release such claims.19 
Finally, the Federal Circuit issued two significant decisions 
addressing cost accounting issues in 2009, both of which were adverse 
to contractors asserting claims against the government.  In Geren v. 
Tecom, Inc.,20 the court established a two-part analysis to determine if 
defense and settlement costs associated with third-party, sexual 
harassment litigation are allowable charges on a government 
contract.21  First, the COFC or Board of Contract Appeals must 
examine whether damages or penalties resulting from an adverse 
judgment would be disallowed under the contract.22  If not, the costs 
are unallowable “unless the contractor can establish that the private 
Title VII plaintiff had very little likelihood of success on the merits.”23  
And in Gates v. Raytheon Co.,24 the court held that under Cost 
Accounting Standard 413-50, contractors must make an adjustment 
during the current accounting period for the sale, discontinued 
operations, or other closure of a business segment.25  Moreover, 
interest on the repayment amount will be compounded daily.26   
This article discusses twenty-four of the twenty-six precedent-setting 
opinions involving government contract law issues, setting forth the 
                                                 
 16. 570 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 17. Id. at 1341. 
 18. Id. at 1344 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority ignored the 
sound findings of the trial court, which concluded “that the parties did not intend to 
release all possible future claims for cumulative impact of the many changes”).  
 19. Id. at 1341 (majority opinion). 
 20. 566 F.3d 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 21. Id. at 1041.   
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 1046. 
 24. 584 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 25. Id. at 1067–68. 
 26. Id. at 1070.   
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relevant facts, the Federal Circuit’s analysis, and—where 
appropriate—the ramifications of these cases.  The decisions are 
grouped into four categories:  (I) bid protests/contract formation; 
(II) fraud; (III) contract performance disputes; and (IV) Winstar and 
Spent Nuclear Fuel cases.27  
                                                 
 27. The two precedential opinions not discussed below are American Contractors 
Indemnity Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and Cambridge v. United 
States, 558 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  In American Contractors, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the COFC’s dismissal for failure to state a claim in a dispute regarding a 
security bond guarantee agreement with the Small Business Administration (SBA).  
570 F.3d at 1377.  The COFC held that the surety had presented no evidence that the 
increase in the amount of the bond guaranty had been approved by the SBA before 
the surety agreed to the increase, as required by the SBA regulations for guarantee of 
surety bonds.  Id. at 1374–75.  The contract ride approving the increased bond 
guaranty was dated before the date of the SBA approval, but the surety claimed that 
it is common practice in the surety industry to “back date” bond increases to match 
the date of a contract change order.  Id. at 1375.  The Federal Circuit held that the 
relevant date for determining SBA liability under the regulations was not the bond’s 
effective date, which was relied on by the COFC, but instead “the date the surety 
‘agrees to or acquiesces in’ a material change to a bond.”  Id. at 1376 (quoting  
13 C.F.R. § 115.19(e) (2009)).  Because “back dating” is not barred by the regulation 
in question, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he mere existence of an earlier 
effective date [than the date of SBA approval] thus does not establish a violation of 
13 C.F.R. § 115.19(e).”  Id. at 1377.  It therefore was improper for the COFC to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, although the Federal Circuit held 
open the possibility that the Government might show on a motion for summary 
judgment that the surety violated the regulation, and therefore the terms of the 
surety guarantee agreement, by modifying the bond without first obtaining approval 
from the SBA.  Id. 
 In Cambridge, the majority decision affirmed the COFC’s dismissal of a claim 
against the United States that Diahann Cambridge was owed a further award based 
on her role as an informant who provided the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with 
information about tax law violations by a named individual.  558 F.3d 1331, 1332, 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  In her complaint, Ms. Cambridge alleged that in September, 
1989 she provided the IRS with information that eventually led to the “detection of a 
tax violation committed by her former husband, Mr. David E. Pierce, in his  
capacity as the owner of Harold’s Chicken Shacks.”  Id. at 1333.  Subsequently,  
Ms. Cambridge filed a Form 211, Application for Reward for Original Information 
with the IRS in January 1991 and received two reward payments of $1,131 in 
February 1997 and $3,429 in February 1998.  Id.  In January 2007, however, the IRS 
notified Ms. Cambridge that no further reward money would be distributed to her 
and that her Application for Reward was considered finalized.  Id.  Ms. Cambridge 
subsequently filed a complaint at the COFC in March 2007 seeking the “balance due” 
on her claim for reward based on 26 U.S.C. § 7623, which allows the Secretary of 
Treasury to pay a reward to individuals as a result of their help in detecting and 
bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating tax laws.  Id. 
 The COFC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that any 
contractual obligation that the IRS had was limited to the two reward amounts it had 
already provided to Ms. Cambridge and that Ms. Cambridge had failed to specify any 
agreement she had with the IRS regarding any additional payments or any actual 
balance owed.  Cambridge v. United States, No. 07-142T, 2007 WL 1888888, at *2 
(Fed. Cl. May 29, 2007).  The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s decision, holding 
that Ms. Cambridge had failed to meet her burden under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), to allege facts “plausibly” showing that the IRS had 
negotiated and fixed a specific amount as her reward.  Cambridge, 558 F.3d at 1335.  
The Court held that Ms. Cambridge’s allegation that, as a result of the information 
she had provided, the IRS had recovered additional taxes from her ex-husband failed 
  
2010] 2009 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS 997 
I. BID PROTESTS/CONTRACT FORMATION 
Judicial restraint and deference were the primary themes of the 
Federal Circuit’s bid protest decisions in 2009.  In all seven of the bid 
protest decisions discussed below, the Federal Circuit sided primarily 
with the Government, and in three of those decisions the Federal 
Circuit reversed (at least in part) the COFC’s decision on the 
grounds that the trial court had exceeded the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s narrow scope of review.  The impact of at least one of 
these decisions, Axiom Resource Management, Inc. v. United States,28 is 
still subject to vigorous debate in recent COFC decisions, as the trial 
court attempts to determine whether Axiom should be limited to its 
unique facts or whether it signals a new trend of judicial restraint in 
the development of the administrative record. 
The Federal Circuit’s decisions also provide helpful guidance in 
procedural areas.  In two cases, Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States29 and 
Labatt Food Services, Inc. v. United States,30 the Federal Circuit 
articulated the standards to be applied to determine whether  
a protester has standing,31 highlighting the difference between  
pre-award and post-award protests.  In Weeks Marine, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that a protester had standing to file a pre-award 
protest challenging the framework of a competition based on a 
minimal showing of likely direct harm; the dissent criticized the 
majority’s theory of standing, noting that it seemed “the claimed 
illegality of the solicitation is itself sufficient to establish injury.”32   
                                                 
to state a claim because even if this allegation were correct, it did not suggest that the 
IRS agreed to pay a fixed additional award to Ms. Cambridge.  Id.  Furthermore, 
nothing else in the record, including the letters from the IRS suggesting that there 
was “a possibility” that she might receive an additional award, “support[ed] the 
existence of the required agreement on the part of the government.”  Id. 
Judge Newman dissented, arguing that the “panel majority depart[ed] from the 
statute and its purpose by holding that no reward need be paid to a tax informer 
absent a prior express agreement with the IRS to pay a reward and specifying the 
amount of reward or how it will be measured.”  Id. at 1337 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
Judge Newman argued that there was no “controlling distinction” between the facts 
presented in Cambridge’s complaint and the facts present in Merrick v. United States, 
846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and that, “[a]pplying Merrick, an implied-in-fact 
contract came into existence at least when a reward payment was made to Ms. 
Cambridge, for the IRS acknowledged that she had provided information that 
warranted a reward.”  Cambridge, 558 F.3d at 1338, 1340. 
 28. 564 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 29. 575 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 30. 577 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 31. See Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1363 (concluding that a “prospective bidder or 
offeror must establish ‘a non-trivial competitive injury which can be redressed by 
judicial relief’ to meet the standing requirement”); Labatt, 577 F.3d at 1379 (noting 
that “an unsuccessful bidder who alleges harmful error in a government bid contest 
in which he has an economic interest has the requisite standing to sue”).  
 32. Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1373.  
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By contrast, in Labatt, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s 
decision on standing in a post-award protest on the grounds that the 
protester had demonstrated only a superficial procedural error in the 
source selection, but failed to make any “showing of how the 
government’s error caused Labatt to suffer disparate treatment or 
particularized harm.”33 
A. Axiom Resource Management, Inc. v. United States 
Axiom Resource Management protested the award of a military 
health care support services contract to Lockheed Martin Federal 
Healthcare, Inc. based on the alleged existence of an unmitigated 
organizational conflict of interest (OCI).34  After two rounds of 
protest before the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and two 
rounds of corrective action by the agency, each resulting in award of 
the contract to Lockheed, the GAO denied Axiom’s third protest.35  
Axiom then protested in the COFC.36  After allowing unlimited 
supplementation of the administrative record, the COFC found that 
the contracting officer (CO) had abused his discretion by awarding 
the contract to Lockheed without developing an adequate OCI 
mitigation plan.37  After further briefing and a request for advice from 
the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Competition, the COFC 
enjoined the Government from exercising the option years on 
Lockheed’s contract.38  On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the 
COFC decision and held that the decision in Esch v. Yeutter,39 on 
which the COFC had relied, is not the law of the Federal Circuit for 
supplementing the administrative record.40  The Federal Circuit 
further held that the COFC had applied an incorrect standard of 
review to the CO’s action—the COFC should have applied the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) rather than a “reasonableness” standard.41 
Before the COFC, Axiom requested to supplement the 
administrative record with “legal pleadings filed before the GAO, 
declarations of Axiom’s employees, and declarations from 
                                                 
 33. Labatt, 577 F.3d at 1380. 
 34. Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  
 35. In re Axiom Res. Mgmt, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-298870.3, B-98870.4, July 12, 2007, 
2007 CPD ¶ 117, at *3, *8. 
 36. Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1378. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 876 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 40. Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1381. 
 41. Id. at 1381–82. 
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consultants retained for litigation.”42  When the Government 
objected, the COFC judge stated that it was her practice “to allow 
everybody to put . . . whatever they want to put into the record in trial 
and even in an administrative record to supplement.”43  The Federal 
Circuit explained that “supplementation of the record should be 
limited to cases in which ‘the omission of extra-record evidence 
precludes effective judicial review.’”44  The Federal Circuit concluded 
that the COFC had erred by allowing supplementation of the record 
without first “evaluating whether the record before the agency was 
sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review.”45  The court further 
noted that the exceptions to record supplementation in Esch v. Yeutter 
had been based on a law review article written before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission46 and that even the D.C. Circuit had backed away from 
Esch’s broad exceptions in recent years.47 
On the merits, the Federal Circuit held that the CO had acted 
reasonably in determining that the OCI mitigation plan submitted by 
Lockheed was sufficient to mitigate the alleged conflicts of interest.48  
Moreover, the Federal Circuit concluded that the COFC erred when, 
without any evidence of arbitrary or capricious conduct by the CO,  
it directed the Government to set aside Lockheed’s contract or 
submit to ongoing court monitoring based on the “unenforceability” 
of Lockheed’s OCI mitigation plan.49  
In the first few months following the Federal Circuit’s decision, 
while acknowledging that “Axiom clearly signaled the Federal Circuit’s 
adoption of a ‘more restrictive’ view of the permissible scope for 
supplementation of the record in a bid protest,”50 judges at the COFC 
nonetheless have used bid protest decisions to debate the import of 
Axiom.51  Two decisions have even declared that the COFC “does not 
interpret the new guidelines in Axiom to change the trial court’s 
                                                 
 42. Id. at 1379. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1380 (quoting Murakami v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 731, 735 (2000), 
aff’d, 398 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 45. Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1380. 
 46. 470 U.S. 729 (1985).   
 47. Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1380. 
 48. Id. at 1383. 
 49. Id. at 1384. 
 50. PlanetSpace, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-476 C, 2009 WL 3808619, at *2 
(Fed. Cl. Nov. 10, 2009) (quoting Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1380–81); see also Kerr 
Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 312, 334 (2009); L-3 Commc’ns 
EOTech, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 656, 671 (2009) (recognizing and applying 
the restrictive standard for supplementation adopted by the Axiom panel). 
 51. L-3 Commc’ns EOTech, 87 Fed. Cl. at 671. 
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practice, other than to emphasize restraint and adherence to 
precedent.”52  Court of Federal Claims opinions also have 
distinguished between extra-record evidence that bears on the 
reasonableness of the agency’s decision-making and “evidentiary 
submissions that go to the prospective relief sought.”53  The COFC in 
those cases admitted evidence related to such issues as the relative 
harms of granting injunctive relief and the potential effect of such 
relief on national security, “not as a supplement to the administrative 
record, but as part of [the COFC’s] record.”54 
Similarly, while at least one COFC judge has noted that the viability 
of any of the Esch factors “remain[s] unclear” after Axiom,55 another 
has held that four of the eight Esch factors are still viable after Axiom: 
 (1) [W]hen the agency action is not adequately explained in the 
record before the court; (2) when the agency failed to consider 
factors which are relevant to its final decision; (3) when an agency 
considered evidence which it failed to include in the record; . . . 
(8) in cases where relief is at issue, especially at the preliminary 
injunction stage.56   
COFC decisions that have applied Axiom outside the context of 
remedies have more often than not allowed the requesting parties to 
supplement the record, including in the following bid protest 
situations:  (1) document “should have been included” in the record 
because it contained contemporaneous communications between the 
                                                 
 52. Totolo/King v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 680, 693 (2009); RhinoCorps Ltd. v. 
United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 261, 273 n.13 (2009); see also Global Computer Enters., Inc. 
v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 52, 62 (2009) (stating that the COFC’s pre-Axiom 
principles for supplementation of the record “remain viable, even after the Federal 
Circuit eschewed reliance upon the specific, broad exceptions enunciated by the Esch 
court under the circumstances presented in Axiom”). 
 53. PlanetSpace, 2009 WL 3808619, at *3; see also AshBritt, Inc. v. United States,  
87 Fed. Cl. 344, 366–67 (2009) (“In general, it is appropriate to add evidence 
pertaining to prejudice and the factors governing injunctive relief to the record in a 
bid protest—not as a supplement to the AR, but as part of this Court’s record.”), 
amended by, 87 Fed. Cl. 654 (2009); Totolo/King, 87 Fed. Cl. at 692–93 (discussing why 
“the administrative record may be supplemented . . . in cases where relief is at issue, 
especially at the preliminary injunction stage”). 
 54. PlanetSpace, 2009 WL 3808619, at *3; see also Akal Sec. Inc. v. United States,  
87 Fed. Cl. 311, 320 n.8 (2009) (“Because the ‘balance of harms’ prong of the test for 
preliminary injunctive relief looks to matters outside the record of award, the court 
finds that the ‘omission of extra-record evidence’ would frustrate or preclude 
‘effective judicial review.’” (quoting Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1379–80, and Murakami,  
46 Fed. Cl. at 735)). 
 55. PlanetSpace, 2009 WL 3808619, at *7. 
 56. Totolo/King, 87 Fed. Cl. at 692–93 (citing Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 
(D.C. Cir. 1989)) (permitting supplementation of the record with an affidavit from 
plaintiff that “provid[ed] evidentiary support . . . for the reasonable inferences drawn 
and arguments made from existing record facts”); accord RhinoCorps, 87 Fed. Cl. at 
273 n.13. 
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agency and the protester;57 (2) material was necessary to correct 
“erroneous and misleading” information in the record;58  
(3) documents necessary to provide the court a complete 
understanding of the “multitude of issues” and “enormous amount of 
information” presented by the parties;59 (4) post-protest affidavit 
explaining the agency’s intent when using a specific phrase in its 
evaluation was “necessary to ensure ‘meaningful’ and ‘effective’ 
judicial review” because “[t]he record without the affidavit does not 
explicitly reflect the answer to this question” of the agency’s intent;60 
and (5) documents in question were explicitly referenced in the 
agency’s source selection analysis.61 
The COFC will likely continue to grapple with the effect of Axiom 
on the scope of the administrative record following an initial protest 
filed at the GAO.  The court’s rules state that “core documents 
relevant to a protest case may include, as appropriate . . . the record of 
any previous administrative or judicial proceeding relating to the 
procurement, including the record of any other protest of the 
procurement.”62  Some COFC decisions appear to interpret this 
permissive rule to mean that the COFC must include the entire record 
before the GAO in the COFC administrative record rather than the 
limited GAO documents that the Competition in Contracting Act 
requires.63  In general, COFC decisions have reconciled Axiom with 
                                                 
 57. Kerr Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 312, 335 (2009). 
 58. AshBritt, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 344, 366 (2009), amended by,  
87 Fed. Cl. 654 (2009). 
 59. Global Computer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 52, 62–63 (2009). 
 60. Academy Facilities Mgmt. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 441, 455 (2009).  
 61. Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 184, 189 (2009).  The COFC also 
has refused to supplement the administrative record in other circumstances, such as 
(1) when photographs were not before the agency during its decision-making and a 
declaration was duplicative of information in the record or irrelevant to the issue at 
hand, Kerr Contractors, 89 Fed. Cl. at 335; (2) when a declaration merely offered the 
Contracting Officer’s opinion on what the court viewed as a legal issue, AshBritt,  
87 Fed. Cl. at 366; and (3) when declarations and exhibits related to test scores the 
court had determined were the result of improper testing procedures and post-hoc 
declaration of fact and argument was not before the agency during its decision-
making, L-3 Commc’ns EOTech, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 656, 672 (2009) 
(noting that the existing record “adequately describes the issues in controversy and 
the decision-making of the Army”). 
 62. CT. FED. CL. R., App. C, ¶ 22(u) (emphasis added). 
 63. See, e.g., Bannum, 89 Fed. Cl. at 188 (“[T]he purpose of the rule . . . is to 
ensure that the Court at least has benefit of the same record that was before the 
GAO.  Materials considered by the GAO should, therefore, also be part of the record 
reviewed by this Court.” (emphasis added)); Holloway & Co. v. United States, 87 Fed. 
Cl. 381, 391 (2009) (“Each of the documents proffered by Holloway relates to the 
protests before GAO and falls into this category [of Appendix C, ¶ 22(u)].  By rule, 
the record therefore should include these materials.” (emphasis added)); DataPath, Inc. 
v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 162, 166 n.3 (2009) (“The Axiom panel also may have 
misunderstood that the trial court did not ‘supplement’ the Administrative Record, 
  
1002 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:991 
the court’s rules to conclude that material included in the record 
before the GAO also should be included in the administrative record 
at the COFC.64  At least one COFC decision disagrees with this 
premise, although the language is contained in dicta.65  In another 
example, the COFC deemed a post-award declaration to be part of 
the administrative record because it was included in the record for 
another protest of the same procurement before the GAO, yet cited 
Axiom to explain why the court gave no weight to the declaration, 
which was not supported by the pre-award record.66 
B. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States 
Weeks Marine, Inc., a dredging contractor, filed a pre-award bid 
protest in the COFC challenging the Army Corps of Engineers’  
(the Corps) decision to solicit proposals for regional maintenance 
dredging and shore protection projects using multiple award, 
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) task order contracts, 
rather than sealed bidding procedures.67  The COFC granted Weeks’s 
motion for judgment on the administrative record, ruling that the 
Corps’ solicitation violated 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2), which provides 
that sealed bidding must be used when an agency plans to award a 
contract based solely on price and price-related factors, and finding 
that the Corps lacked a rational basis for departing from its 
traditional district-by-district procurement strategy, in which 
                                                 
because [Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims] Appendix C, ¶ 22(u) 
provides that declarations filed in a prior protest before the General Accountability 
Office [sic] are part of the Administrative Record.” (emphasis added)); Red River 
Holdings, LLC v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 768, 788 n.28 (noting that the COFC’s 
rules “provide[] that declarations filed in a prior GAO protest are part of the 
[Administrative Record]” (citing DataPath, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 162, 166 
(2009) (emphasis added)).  See 31 U.S.C. § 3556 (for protests filed at the COFC after 
a GAO protest, the initial agency report, any reports to Congress and any decision or 
recommendation by GAO “shall be considered to be part of the agency record 
subject to review.”).   
 64. See Holloway, 87 Fed. Cl. at 391–92 (acknowledging Axiom in a decision 
granting motion to supplement the COFC record with material included in record 
before the GAO); Bannum, 89 Fed. Cl. at 189 (“The Federal Circuit’s recent decision 
in Axiom, does not undermine the Court’s rules for determining the content of the 
administration record.”); see also Acad. Facilities Mgmt. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 
441, 454–55 (2009) (noting that under Holloway, a post-hoc affidavit by the Source 
Selection Authority that was part of the record before the GAO would be admitted 
into the record at the COFC).  
 65. See RhinoCorps Ltd. Co. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 261, 276 n.18 (2009) 
(disagreeing with Holloway and stating that documents generated after the agency 
decision and in the course of an administrative protest may be cited “as admissions 
or inconsistent positions” but cannot supplement the administrative record before 
the COFC). 
 66. Red River Holdings, 87 Fed. Cl. at 787–88.  
 67. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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individual dredging efforts were sourced locally through sealed 
bidding.68  On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the trial court, 
holding that the solicitation for the regional multiple award contracts 
did call for evaluation of non-price factors, and that the solicitation 
was rationally designed to address several of the Corps’ goals.69   
Weeks Marine is notable for two reasons.  First, it clearly articulates 
the Circuit’s standard for establishing standing in a pre-award protest 
challenging the terms of a solicitation, and clarifies the previously 
implicit distinction between the types of harm a plaintiff must 
demonstrate in a pre-award versus a post-award protest.  Second,  
in reversing the COFC’s decision, the Weeks Marine reiterates the 
recent emphasis on judicial restraint, which was also emphasized in 
the Axiom and Alabama Aircraft Industries decisions this year. 
The court recognized that it had not previously articulated the 
standard that should be applied in a pre-award protest to determine 
whether a prospective offeror has an economic interest, and 
therefore prejudice, sufficient to establish standing to challenge a 
solicitation.70  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), standing “is limited to 
actual or prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic 
interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by the 
failure to award the contract.”71  On appeal, the Corps argued that 
Weeks failed to demonstrate prejudice or harm arising from the 
Corps’ solicitation, and that any potential injury would be speculative 
and shared by all bidders.72  The Corps drew upon the standard for 
establishing standing in post-award bid protests, in which “[t]o establish 
prejudice, the protester must show that there was a ‘substantial 
chance’ it would have received the contract award but for the alleged 
error in the procurement process.”73  Weeks, in contrast, argued that 
it would suffer prejudice from competing in a “discretionary, 
subjective and essentially unreviewable process,” and that its  
long-term marketing strategy was based upon sealed bidding.74 
The court observed that “[i]n such a case [i.e., a pre-award 
protest], it is difficult for a prospective bidder/offeror to make the 
showing of prejudice that we have required in post-award bid protest 
                                                 
 68. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 22, 29-30 (2007). 
 69. Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1364.  
 70. Id. at 1361.  
 71. Id. at 1359 (quoting Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. United States, 258 F.3d 
1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 72. Id. at 1360. 
 73. Id. (quoting Info Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 74. Id. 
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cases” because “there is no factual foundation for a ‘but for’ 
prejudice analysis.”75  The COFC had applied a standard that had 
previously been articulated in WinStar Communications, Inc. v. United 
States,76 in which standing is established by alleging “a non-trivial 
competitive injury which can be redressed by judicial relief.”77   
The Federal Circuit determined that this standard “strikes the 
appropriate balance” between § 1491(b)(1)’s “interested party” 
requirements and Article III standing requirements, and agreed that 
it is the appropriate standard to apply in a pre-award challenge to an 
agency’s solicitation.78  The court subsequently determined that 
Weeks had standing because it had alleged a facial defect in the 
solicitation that would materially affect how Weeks would be required 
to do business with the Corps for the duration of the IDIQ contract.79 
The court then turned to the merits of Weeks’s claim, focusing on 
whether the Corps established a rational basis for structuring its 
procurement.  The COFC had sustained Weeks’s protest on the basis 
that the agency’s Acquisition Plan failed to establish a rational basis 
for departing from traditional sealed bidding procedures and relying 
instead on negotiated task order awards that would purportedly focus 
on non-price factors, in addition to price.80  Among other findings, 
the COFC determined that it was unlikely that the Corps intended to 
make task order awards based on non-price factors, because its  
non-price factors appeared to focus largely on matters for which a 
responsibility determination under Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) § 9.104 would suffice instead.81  The Corps therefore would be 
required to use traditional sealed bidding procedures under  
10 U.S.C. § 2304.82  Moreover, the court was not persuaded by 
                                                 
 75. Id. 
 76. 41 Fed. Cl. 748 (1998). 
 77. Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1361. 
 78. Id. at 1362. 
 79. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk disagreed that Weeks had standing, 
noting that “Weeks Marine made no allegations of injury in its complaint and 
appears to have filed no affidavits or declarations providing a basis for finding that 
the solicitation was likely to cause injury.”  Id. at 1371–72 (Dyk, J., dissenting).   
The dissent noted that “[t]he majority’s theory [of standing] appears to be that the 
claimed illegality of the solicitation is itself sufficient to establish injury,” but that this 
was not sufficient to demonstrate Article III standing.  Id. at 1373–74 (citing Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984)) (“[A]n asserted right to have the Government act 
in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a 
federal court.”).  Instead, the dissent would have required a showing that Weeks’s 
“direct economic interests have been adversely affected” to qualify as an “interested 
party” that had standing to protest.  Id. at 1375–76. 
 80. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 22, 28–34 (2007). 
 81. Id. at 30. 
 82. Id. 
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additional justifications identified in the Acquisition Plan—including 
a reduced procurement cycle, reduced administrative costs, reduced 
need for emergency contracting, and eliminating inter-district 
competition for limited resources.83  The court generally concluded 
that the Acquisition Plan and other sparse record documentation 
failed to sufficiently justify the planned change to a regional, 
negotiated task order contract because the court did not believe that 
the benefits the agency anticipated from the changed strategy were 
material.84 
On appeal, the Corps noted that the solicitation on its face called 
for the evaluation of non-price factors including technical merit, past 
performance, and small business concerns, and therefore properly 
qualified as a permissible negotiated procurement, not a sealed 
bidding procedure.85  It further pointed out “that ‘past performance 
is considered significantly more important than price,’ and that  
‘all evaluation factors, when combined, are significantly more 
important than price.’”86  On that basis, the Federal Circuit agreed 
that the solicitation did not violate 10 U.S.C. § 2304, and that it was 
not a sealed bid.87  Thus, the court determined that the issue was 
“whether the Government established a rational basis for the 
structuring of the procurement.”88 
As for the merits of the Corps’ decision to change its acquisition 
strategy, the Corps argued that the COFC erred in concluding that 
the benefits the Corps expected to derive from the change in 
procurement strategy did not constitute a rational basis for making 
that change, and that there were seven specific benefits that the 
agency anticipated, including the ability to: 
(1) pick more qualified contractors because [the Corps] will be 
able to rely on factors other than price; (2) reduce procurement 
time; (3) lower administrative costs by an estimated $1.45 million 
in the next two years; (4) reduce or eliminate the need for 
emergency procurements; (5) have greater coordination between 
individual districts of the South Atlantic Division; (6) facilitate the 
use of small businesses; and (7) promote national security through 
more timely execution of dredging near military bases.89   
                                                 
 83. Id. at 32–34. 
 84. Id. at 34. 
 85. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1364–65. 
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Citing CHE Consulting, Inc. v. United States,90 the Federal Circuit 
explained that when an agency identifies concerns or reasons for a 
procurement strategy in the administrative record and those 
concerns provide a rational basis for the procurement decision, the 
agency need not provide additional evidence that supports those 
concerns.91  Applying that rule here, the Federal Circuit determined 
that the Corps had provided “seven specific reasons for its 
procurement action, each of which represents a legitimate 
procurement objective.”92  Although the Corps did not provide 
empirical evidence showing how each of these goals would bear out, 
it did identify the “reasons for its procurement decision and the 
thinking behind those reasons,” which provided a sufficient rational 
basis for that decision.93 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit concluded that if it were to find that 
the agency lacked a rational basis for its decision, it “would be 
second-guessing the Corps’s action.  That is something we are not 
permitted to do.”94  It quoted its earlier statement in Honeywell, Inc. v. 
United States,95 that “[i]f the court finds a reasonable basis for the 
agency’s action, the court should stay its hand even though it might, 
as an original proposition, have reached a different conclusion as to 
the proper administration and application of the procurement 
regulations.”96 
C. Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. v. United States 
Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. (“AAII”) protested the Air Force’s 
award of a multi-billion dollar contract to the Boeing Company for 
long-term maintenance (five-year base period, plus five one-year 
options) of the KC-135 aerial refueling tanker aircraft fleet.97   
After the COFC sustained AAII’s protest, the Federal Circuit reversed, 
concluding that the COFC’s ruling effectively “introduce[d] new 
requirements outside the scope of the RFP” and exceeded the scope 
of the trial court’s review.98 
                                                 
 90. 552 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 91. Id. at 1354. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1371. 
 95. 870 F.2d 644 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 96. Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Honeywell, 870 F.2d at 648). 
 97. Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  
 98. Id. at 1376.  
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AAII had previously protested the award at the GAO in 2007,  
at which time the GAO sustained the protest on the sole ground  
that the record was insufficient for the GAO to determine  
the reasonableness of the Air Force’s price realism analysis.99   
GAO signaled concerns with Boeing’s proposed labor hour 
reductions in light of the fact that the KC-135 fleet would continue to 
age during the life of the contract.100  Following the protest, the Air 
Force reevaluated the realism of the offerors’ proposed prices and 
documented factors supporting its conclusion that proposed prices 
were realistic and reasonable.101  The Air Force “noted that because 
aging aircraft issues were not predictable with any certainty, the RFP 
instructed offerors to base their proposals on a three-tier work 
package” included in the RFP, and also “provided for the [Air Force] 
to negotiate new work packages as might be needed in future 
years.”102  The Air Force thus concluded that it was not required to 
consider aging-aircraft issues in its price realism analysis.103  The Air 
Force affirmed the award to Boeing, and AAII protested to the GAO 
again, but, in light of the Air Force’s rationale for its price realism 
analysis, the GAO denied the second protest.104 
AAII subsequently protested the award at the COFC, which granted 
AAII’s request for injunctive relief.105  The COFC found the Air 
Force’s price realism analysis to be arbitrary and capricious because it 
sought “to sidestep the aging-fleet issue.”106  The COFC concluded 
that the solicitation did not “explicitly” or adequately address aging-
aircraft issues, as the Air Force contended, and that the Air Force 
therefore should have considered aging-aircraft issues in conjunction 
with its price realism analysis.107  The Air Force and Boeing appealed 
the COFC’s decision.108 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC.109  Noting that 
the central concern in the COFC’s decision was “the issue of aging 
aircraft,” the Federal Circuit agreed with the COFC “that the issue of 
aging aircraft was not explicitly addressed in the Air Force’s RFP.”110  
                                                 
 99. Id. at 1374. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 666, 703 (2008), rev’d 
586 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 106. Id. at 700. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Ala. Aircraft, 586 F.3d at 1374. 
 109. See id. at 1376 (vacating the injunction against the Boeing contract). 
 110. Id. at 1375. 
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However, the Federal Circuit noted that due to the unpredictability 
of aging-aircraft impacts on maintenance requirements, the agency 
had elected to require the offerors instead to propose prices for 
specific work packages: 
The agency decided to handle the uncertainties associated with the 
maintenance of aging aircraft by requiring offerors to base their 
proposals on a work package that included three elements . . . 
[and] [t]he RFP explained to offerors exactly how their price 
proposals would be evaluated based on their prices for these 
various elements of the work package.  The agency believed that 
this comprehensive framework, along with the periodic 
adjustments to the work package contemplated by the RFP, was the 
best way to account for the uncertain impact of aging aircraft.111 
Although the Air Force determined that this was the best approach, 
the Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he trial court thought otherwise” 
because the COFC found “that the RFP should have explicitly 
addressed the problem of aging aircraft.”112  As a result of that 
finding, the COFC “attempt[ed] to rewrite the RFP to account for the 
impact of aging aircraft in the manner the court preferred [and] 
went beyond the scope of the court’s review . . . .”113  As a result, the 
COFC’s decision “amounted to an impermissible substitution of the 
court’s judgment for the agency’s with regard to how the contract 
work should be designed.”114 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit determined that the Air Force had 
considered the aging-aircraft issue, “but because the impact on future 
requirements was unknown, it decided the best approach was to 
provide all offerors with the three-tier work package on which to base 
their proposals.”115  Since it was within the agency’s discretion to 
organize its competition in that fashion, the Air Force’s subsequent 
price realism analysis based on the announced work packages was not 
arbitrary and capricious.116 
D. Labatt Food Service, Inc. v. United States 
The Labatt decision provides further guidance regarding standing 
in post-award protests and, in particular, clarifies the notion that not 
all violations of procurement law or regulation during a competition 
result in prejudicial error justifying a protest.  Labatt Food Service, 
                                                 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1376. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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Inc. protested the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) award of a 
contract to provide food distributor services for military facilities.117  
Labatt’s final proposal revision was not considered for award because 
it was submitted late and by email, a prohibited means of 
transmission.118  The solicitation required all proposal modifications 
or revisions to be submitted in hard copy or via facsimile.119  After 
reviewing initial proposals, DLA sent an email to all offerors opening 
discussions and requesting additional information and, despite the 
solicitation’s restriction, all three offerors responded to that request 
by email.120  DLA subsequently made an award, but following a 
successful GAO protest (filed by Labatt) it took corrective action and 
solicited revised proposals.121  Again, all three offerors submitted 
revisions by email.122  Labatt again protested with the GAO, 
challenging a changed solicitation requirement, which spurred the 
government to request revised proposals.123  Although the 
government specifically requested that the final round of proposal 
revisions be submitted in hard copy via Federal Express by a 2:00 p.m. 
deadline, Labatt submitted its revision by email more than two hours 
late.124  The other two offerors timely submitted their revisions via 
Federal Express.125  Labatt’s proposal revision was not considered for 
award because it had been untimely submitted via email.126 
The COFC granted Labatt’s request for permanent injunctive 
relief, finding that the DLA had previously relied upon email 
transmissions in violation of the terms of the solicitation, and that by 
deviating from the solicitation’s scheme the agency had “violate[d] 
the fundamental fairness of the procurement process.”127  The COFC 
acknowledged that Labatt’s late submission would typically render its 
proposal unawardable and preclude Labatt from establishing 
standing.128  The court, however, relied on the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States129 
                                                 
 117. Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 118. Id. at 1378. 
 119. Id. at 1377. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1377–78. 
 122. Id. at 1378. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 50, 60, 66 (2008), rev’d, 
577 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 128. Id. at 62. 
 129. 238 F.3d 1324, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (granting injunctive relief because 
the Government made an arbitrary and capricious responsibility determination 
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to conclude that the DLA’s earlier use of email transmissions meant 
that the entire competition was “fatally flawed” and should be 
“rebid,” at which time the court determined that Labatt would have a 
substantial chance of winning the competition.130  On appeal,  
the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s decision and concluded that 
the protester lacked standing because it failed to demonstrate any 
prejudicial error and submitted a late proposal revision.131  The COFC 
found that “because the three offerors improperly submitted the first 
round proposal revisions via e-mail, all proposals had been effectively 
withdrawn at that time and therefore eliminated from the 
competition.”132  The Federal Circuit disagreed with this rationale and 
the COFC’s reliance on Garufi:  “The critical difference between 
Garufi and the present case is not the existence of error on the part 
of the government, but the allegation of an error that, taken as true, 
would be prejudicial to the complaining party’s attempt to procure 
the contract.”133  The court stressed that the existence of errors or 
mistakes in the procurement process, alone, does not “nullify the 
contest” and require that the procuring agency “begin anew” for the 
protester.134  Instead, the error must result in some form of 
particularized prejudice in order to establish standing.135  
Furthermore, the court warned that a party’s economic interest in 
the procurement or the potential to win a contract in a new 
competition—the hallmarks of “interested party” status—is separate 
from any assessment of whether a party has standing: 
Here, however, there is no showing of how the government’s error 
caused Labatt to suffer disparate treatment or particularized harm.  
Instead, Labatt tautologically argues that it was harmed by the 
method of transmission error because it would have a substantial 
chance of receiving the contract award in a rebid.  By conflating 
the standing requirements of prejudicial error and economic 
interest, Labatt would create a rule that, to an unsuccessful but 
economically interested offeror in a bid protest, any error is 
harmful.  Under this radical formulation there would be no such 
thing as an error non-prejudicial to an economically interested 
offeror in a bid contest.  We decline to adopt such a rule.  Instead, 
we reiterate the established law in this circuit that non-prejudicial 
                                                 
regarding the winning bidder’s record of integrity and business ethics), rev’d,  
531 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 130. Labatt, 84 Fed. Cl. at 61–62. 
 131. Labatt, 577 F.3d at 1380–81. 
 132. Id. at 1379. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1380. 
 135. Id. 
  
2010] 2009 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS 1011 
errors in a bid process do not automatically invalidate a 
procurement.136 
Here, the Federal Circuit concluded that Labatt had failed to show 
that the government’s improper acceptance of emails interfered with 
Labatt’s ability to win the contract award because there was no 
connection between Labatt’s late filing and the error in the 
government’s method of transmission.137  Labatt’s late submission, on 
the other hand, disqualified it from the competition.138  Referring to 
what is commonly called the “late is late rule,” the court noted that, 
in order to avoid the potential for abuse, “submission deadlines are 
strictly enforced across the board.”139  Labatt’s late proposal revision 
was “tantamount to no proposal at all,” and therefore Labatt could 
not demonstrate that it had a “substantial chance” of award and had 
“no more standing to sue than the proverbial man on the street.”140 
E. Tyler Construction Group v. United States141 
Tyler Construction Group filed a pre-award protest in the COFC 
challenging the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ use of a 
multiple award, IDIQ contract for design and construction of various 
types of military facilities in the Southeastern United States.142   
Tyler complained that the Corps was not permitted to use an IDIQ 
contract to procure construction services and that the bundled 
procurement overstated the agency’s requirements and violated the 
Small Business Act.143  The COFC granted the Government’s motion 
for judgment on the administrative record, and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed that decision.144  The Federal Circuit’s decision was 
consistent with others in which broad discretion is afforded to agency 
officials to shape the nature and scope of a procurement to best meet 
the Government’s requirements, so long as the procurement 
procedures do not violate a statute or regulation and there is an 
adequate justification for the agency’s action.145 
                                                 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1380–81. 
 138. Id. at 1381. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. 570 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 142. Tyler Const. Group v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 94, 95 (2008), aff’d, 570 F.3d 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 143. Id. at 96. 
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The FAR provisions in subpart 16.5 that address IDIQ contracts 
state that IDIQ vehicles “may be used to acquire supplies and/or 
services when the exact times and/or exact quantities of future 
deliveries are not known at the time of contract award.”146  IDIQ 
contracts may be appropriate “when the Government cannot 
predetermine, above a specified minimum, the precise quantities of 
supplies or services that the Government will require during the 
contract period.”147 
Tyler argued on appeal that the FAR does not permit an IDIQ 
contract vehicle to be used for large-scale building construction 
services because “services,” as used in FAR subpart 16.5, does not 
specifically include “construction” services.148  Tyler noted that other 
provisions in the FAR refer to “services,” followed immediately by the 
reference “(including construction),” but that the omission of the 
“(including construction)” reference in FAR subpart 16.5 meant that 
construction services were not intended to be procured using an 
IDIQ contract.149  The court disagreed with this construction, noting 
that other references to services in the FAR are sometimes 
accompanied by an opposite “(excluding construction)” exception.150  
Instead, the court noted that “the proper inquiry is not whether the 
FAR authorizes the use of IDIQ contracts for a procurement of 
construction, but whether there is any statutory or regulatory 
provision that precludes such use.”151 
Here, the court agreed with the COFC “that the Corps’ use of IDIQ 
contracts to effect this procurement of military housing ‘represents 
the sort of innovation envisioned by [FAR 1.102] and, with its 
identification of both a contract dollar value and a general scope of 
work, constitutes a permissible exercise of IDIQ contracting 
authority.’”152  The court noted that the Corps had undertaken a 
thorough pre-solicitation research effort and that it reasonably 
determined that the use of IDIQ contracts “was the most appropriate 
                                                 
 146. Tyler Constr., 570 F.3d at 1332 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 16.501-2(a) (2009)). 
 147. Id. at 1332–33 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 16.504(b) (2009)). 
 148. Id. at 1331. 
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 150. Id. at 1333. 
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method of proceeding and therefore best served the interests of the 
United States.”153 
Tyler also argued that the Corps “violated statutory and regulatory 
provisions designed to aid and protect small businesses,” pointing 
primarily to the anti-bundling provisions of the Small Business Act.154  
Tyler complained that the Corps’ combination of multiple 
construction efforts under the single umbrella contract resulted in a 
procurement whose dollar amount was beyond the financial capacity 
of small business firms that could have competed for individual 
construction efforts of a smaller size.155  The Federal Circuit 
disagreed, noting that the Small Business Act “does not prohibit all 
bundling of contract requirements, but only ‘unnecessary and 
unjustified bundling.’”156  The court held that the Corps reasonably 
concluded that “successfully meeting the Army’s goals in construction 
costs and time would require a departure from the Corps’ traditional 
‘one project at a time’ approach in favor of an acquisition strategy 
that maximized economies of scale.”157  On that record, the court 
concluded that the Corps’ selection of the IDIQ vehicle was 
reasonable and did not constitute an unnecessary bundling.158  
Furthermore, the court pointed out that the Corps had included 
small business subcontracting requirements in its acquisition strategy 
to ensure that opportunities would be available for small business 
construction companies, and therefore “endeavored, as far as 
practicable, to comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements 
and policies for small business participation in government 
procurement.”159 
F. Centech Group, Inc. v. United States160 
The Centech Group, Inc. was previously awarded a small business 
set-aside contract by the Air Force to perform advisory services, but 
during a GAO protest the Air Force learned that Centech failed to 
comply with the solicitation’s Limitation on Subcontracting (LOS) 
clause.161  When the Air Force undertook corrective action, Centech 
filed a bid protest in the COFC claiming that the Air Force’s 
                                                 
 153. Id. at 1334. 
 154. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 631(j)(3) (2006)). 
 155. Id.   
 156. Id. at 1335 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 631(j)(3) (1997)). 
 157. Id. (quoting Tyler Constr., 83 Fed. Cl. at 103 (2008)). 
 158. Id. at 1336. 
 159. Id.  
 160. 554 F.3d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 161. Id. at 1031–35. 
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corrective action was improper.162  The COFC denied Centech’s 
request for injunctive relief,163 and the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
decision.164 
The primary issue in the protest involved the proper interpretation 
and application of the LOS clause at FAR 52.219-14, implemented 
pursuant to the Small Business Act.165  Under the LOS clause,  
an offeror must agree that at least fifty percent of its personnel costs 
under the contract will be based upon work of the small business 
prime contractor’s own employees.166  The solicitation incorporated 
the LOS clause by reference, but the Air Force informed offerors that 
it would interpret the LOS clause in accordance with an Air Force 
Policy Memorandum that stated: 
[W]ithin [Air Force Material Command], we interpret the clause at 
52.219-14 to mean that the minimum amounts of work can be 
performed by the collective efforts of either small business 
members of a formal joint venture or a small business prime 
contractor together with the first tier small business 
subcontractor(s) . . . .167 
Essentially, the memo stated that the Air Force interpreted the LOS 
clause to mean that a small business prime contractor could 
aggregate the small business costs between itself and its first-tier small 
business subcontractors to satisfy the LOS requirement.168 
Centech relied on this Policy Memorandum and proposed to incur 
43.2 percent of the total cost of the contract using its own employees, 
and to combine those efforts with other small business subcontractors 
to exceed the fifty percent LOS requirement.169  Following award to 
Centech, another offeror, Tybrin, protested at GAO and argued that 
Centech’s proposal failed to comply with the LOS requirements.170  
GAO sought the views of the Small Business Administration (SBA), 
and the SBA took the position that, in accordance with 15 U.S.C.  
§ 644(o)(1)(A) and SBA regulation 13 C.F.R. § 125.6(a)(1), “a small 
business receiving a set-aside contract must agree to meet by itself the 
requirements of the LOS clause,” thus invalidating the Air Force’s 
                                                 
 162. Id. at 1035–36. 
 163. Centech Group, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 562, 577 (2007), aff’d,  
554 F.3d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 164. Centech, 554 F.3d at 1040. 
 165. Id. at 1031. 
 166. Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.219-14 (2008)). 
 167. Id. at 1032. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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Policy Memorandum.171  The Air Force subsequently rescinded its 
Policy Memorandum and elected to take corrective action to 
reconsider whether Centech met the LOS requirements, and GAO 
dismissed the protest as moot.172  Centech later notified the 
contracting officer by mail that, although its initial proposal was 
consistent with the Policy Memorandum and stated that Centech’s 
own employees would only account for 43.5% of the effort, Centech 
had already performed more than 51% of the work, itself, and would 
continue to do so; Centech submitted revised cost models to reflect 
that prospective change.173  Nevertheless, the contracting officer 
determined that Centech’s proposal, on its face, failed to comply with 
the LOS requirement, rendering Centech ineligible for contract 
award.174  Centech appealed that decision, contending that the 
contracting officer was required to consider Centech’s additional 
information regarding its ability to self-perform more than 51% of 
the contract work.175  The Air Force referred the matter of Centech’s 
“responsibility” to the SBA, and Centech subsequently provided 
additional documentation to the SBA, including narratives,  
a compliance matrix, and spreadsheets that showed Centech had 
changed its previously proposed mix of prime and subcontractor 
labor costs.176  Based on this additional information, the SBA 
informed the contracting officer that the SBA concluded Centech 
would comply with the LOS clause and that the SBA found Centech to 
be responsible.177 
Based on the SBA’s conclusions, the Air Force reinstated the 
contract award to Centech, prompting another protest from Tybrin 
claiming that the Air Force should have found Centech’s proposal 
unacceptable based on its failure to comply with the LOS clause.178  
GAO sustained Tybrin’s protest.179  Although GAO noted that the 
issue of small business “responsibility” is generally a matter for the 
SBA, where a proposal on its face leads an agency to conclude that an 
offeror has not agreed to comply with the LOS clause, the matter is 
                                                 
 171. Id. at 1033 (citing 15 U.S.C § 644(o)(1)(A) (2006) and 13 C.F.R.  
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one of the proposal’s “acceptability,” not one of “responsibility.”180  
Based on the Air Force’s conclusion that Centech did not comply 
with the LOS, GAO concluded that the Air Force should have found 
Centech’s proposal to be unacceptable for award and recommended 
that the Air Force reopen discussions and solicit revised proposals, 
which it did.181 
Centech protested the Air Force’s corrective action to the COFC, 
seeking reinstatement of its award and declaratory relief that the  
Air Force’s decision to follow GAO’s recommendation for corrective 
action was arbitrary and capricious.182  Centech argued that the issue 
of LOS compliance was not one of “acceptability” that should have 
been evaluated as a condition of award, but instead whether 
Centech’s performance actually complied with the LOS contract 
clause should have been examined as a matter of post-award contract 
administration.183  The COFC declined Centech’s request for relief, 
noting that Centech’s proposal, on its face, did not comply with  
15 U.S.C. § 644(o).184  The COFC also concluded that the LOS clause 
was a material solicitation requirement, and Centech’s failure to 
comply with that term rendered its proposal unacceptable.185 
The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that a “subcontracting 
limitation, including the LOS clause, is a material RFP term and a 
condition of a solicitation to which the offeror must agree in its 
proposal.”186  The court determined that compliance is material 
“because the mix of prime-subcontractor labor affects cost 
evaluation.”187  Centech argued that even if the LOS was a material 
requirement, its proposal was not facially non-compliant with the 
LOS because Centech only proposed to self-perform less than 50% of 
the effort based on its reliance on the Air Force’s Policy 
Memorandum.188  The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by that tack, 
because even if Centech had relied on the Policy Memorandum, 
“[t]he Air Force Material Command could not, through the Policy 
                                                 
 180. Centech Group, Inc., 554 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Tybrin Corp., Comp. Gen.  
B-298364.6, at 5). 
 181. Id. at 1035 (quoting Tybrin Corp., Comp. Gen. B-298364.6, at 7). 
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Memorandum, alter the requirements of the LOS clause, which was 
mandated by statute and regulation.”189 
The court recognized that acquisition regulations state that when a 
contracting officer determines that a small business cannot meet the 
LOS requirements, that finding “shall be treated as an element of 
responsibility and shall be subject to the [SBA’s Certificate of 
Competency] process.”190  However, the court found that those 
regulations did not apply here because Centech’s acceptability did 
not turn on whether it could comply with the LOS (which would have 
been an issue for the SBA), but rather whether its proposal stated 
that it would comply with the LOS.191  The court concluded that the 
latter issue was properly within the contracting officer’s discretion, 
and that it was clear from the face of Centech’s proposal that it had 
not proposed to meet the 50% requirement.192 
G. Tip Top Construction, Inc. v. United States193 
Tip Top Construction, Inc. protested the intended award of a 
contract by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) under an 
invitation for bids to construct a traffic circle and related work on the 
island of St. John in the U.S. Virgin Islands.194  Tip Top argued that 
the contracting officer improperly rejected its low-priced bid on the 
ground that the bid was not accompanied by a satisfactory bid 
bond.195  Following notification that its bid had been rejected,  
Tip Top filed a protest at the GAO, which was denied.196  Tip Top 
subsequently filed a complaint in the COFC seeking to enjoin the 
contract award.197  The court granted the Government’s motion for 
judgment on the administrative record and subsequently denied  
Tip Top’s request for reconsideration, concluding that the 
contracting officer had reasonably determined that Tip Top’s bid 
bond did not comply with FAR requirements.198  On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s decision and agreed that the 
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contracting officer reasonably determined that Tip Top failed to 
pledge an acceptable asset for its bid bond.199  At its heart, the Federal 
Circuit’s decision reaffirmed the contracting officer’s ability to 
exercise discretion in the procurement process in cases where the 
acquisition regulations delegate subjective decisions to the 
contracting officer, so long as the basis for that discretion is 
rational.200 
The solicitation included the clause at FAR 52.228-1 and required 
that all bids be accompanied by a bid guarantee of at least twenty 
percent of the bid price or $3 million, whichever was less.201  
Accordingly, Tip Top’s bid was accompanied by a bid bond provided 
by a personal surety, which consisted of the surety’s pledge of an 
“allocated portion of $191,350,000.00 of previously mined, extracted, 
stockpiled and marketable coal, located on the property of E.C. 
Scarborough [i.e., the surety]” in West Virginia.202  The contracting 
officer rejected Tip Top’s bid because its bid bond did not meet the 
requirements of FAR 28.203: 
Individual Surety Bonds must be supported by acceptable assets, as 
listed in the FAR.  Acceptable assets include cash, United Sates 
Government securities, stocks and bonds that are actively traded, 
real property owned in fee simple, and irrevocable letters of credit.  
Speculative assets—which would include marketable coal—are 
specifically excluded by [FAR] 28.203-2(c)(7).203 
Tip Top’s president subsequently emailed the contracting officer 
declaring that its surety had “other marketable assets including cash,” 
and then phoned the contracting officer and verbally offered to have 
the surety substitute a different asset.204  The contracting officer told 
Tip Top that “the FARs would not allow for a substitute asset by the 
individual surety and that she would not accept it.”205  Tip Top’s 
surety then contacted the contracting officer and offered to provide 
additional documentation as to the quality and market price of the 
pledged coal, contending that other federal agencies had previously 
accepted the coal as a pledged asset.206  Notwithstanding that offer, 
which the contracting officer determined to be untimely, the 
contracting officer determined that Tip Top had failed to provide an 
                                                 
 199. Tip Top Constr., 563 F.3d at 1339, 1343. 
 200. Id. at 1344. 
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 202. Id. at 1339–40. 
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acceptable individual surety in support of its bid guarantee and 
rejected Tip Top’s bid as nonresponsible under FAR 28.203(c).   
The contracting officer concluded that “the asset listed in this 
instance—mined but not marketed coal—is closer in similarity to a 
corporate asset, speculative asset, or accounts receivable,” which are 
listed as unacceptable assets under the FAR.207 
In response to Tip Top’s protest at the GAO, the contracting 
officer stated that she had “concluded coal was a speculative asset 
because its actual value could not be ascertained until it was sold, its 
price could fluctuate depending on its quality and market conditions, 
and it would be a difficult asset . . . to liquidate.”208  In an attempt to 
clarify the coal’s value, Tip Top submitted a document that showed 
the proffered coal was actually “coal refuse” that would need to be 
reprocessed before any sale.209  The GAO denied Tip Top’s protest, 
and the COFC “determined that it was permissible for the FHWA to 
reject the bid bond without granting Tip Top’s request for a 
substitution of assets.”210 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Tip Top argued that the 
contracting officer:  (1) “incorrectly concluded that the pledged coal 
was not an acceptable asset under the FAR . . .”; (2) “was required to 
provide the surety an opportunity to support the pledged asset or 
submit a substitute asset;” and (3) “erred in rejecting Tip Top’s offer 
to provide a substitute asset.”211 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the contracting officer’s 
application of FAR 28.203-2(a) and her determination that the 
pledged coal was not the type of asset that is acceptable under the 
FAR as a bid bond asset.212  The court noted that “the FAR defines the 
types of acceptable bid bond assets as those that have an identifiable 
value and are readily marketable, so that they can easily be sold to 
cover any expenses incurred by the government as a result of the 
bidder’s failure to satisfy its obligation.”213  The primary emphasized 
difference between acceptable and unacceptable pledged assets lies 
in the asset’s discernible value and liquidity.214  In light of this 
emphasis, the court did not believe that the mined coal met this 
standard because it “is clearly less liquid than cash, stocks, certificates 
                                                 
 207. Id. at 1340–41, 1345. 
 208. Id. at 1341. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1343–44. 
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of deposit, and bonds.”215  Although Tip Top argued that a coal 
market exists, ensuring liquidity, the court noted that “the fact that 
there is some market for a product does not mean that the product is 
readily marketable.”216  The court noted that the value and 
marketability of coal is inherently dependent on product quality, 
transportation and processing costs, and market volatility.217  
“Consequently, pledges of assets such as mined coal place a greater 
burden on the contracting officer and present a greater risk of loss to 
the government,” and thus, the contracting officer properly rejected 
the pledged coal asset as a sufficient bid bond.218 
Tip Top also argued that the contracting officer should have 
permitted the surety to provide additional information regarding the 
value and nature of the coal, which the contracting officer rejected as 
“untimely.”219  The court concluded that such an error would be  
non-prejudicial because the contracting officer later stated that  
“even if an independent proof of value and ownership had been 
provided, the asset would still be so speculative as to be unacceptable 
because of the liquidity issue.”220 
Finally, Tip Top argued that the contracting officer improperly 
refused to accept an offer for a substitute asset.221  Pursuant to FAR 
28.203-4, an individual surety may offer a substitute asset by 
submitting a written request to the contracting officer.222  Tip Top 
noted that its president had sent an email to the contracting officer 
stating that “[t]he bid bond entity has other marketable assets 
including cash,” and that in a subsequent phone call he verbally 
informed the contracting officer that “the surety was willing to 
provide a substitute asset or cash in support of the bid bond [Tip 
Top] provided.”223  In response, the contracting officer reportedly 
told Tip Top that the FAR prohibited her from considering a pledge 
of substitute assets.224  As a “threshold matter,” the court noted that  
“it is clear that a contracting officer is permitted to agree to a 
substitution of assets but is not obligated to do so.”225  Here, the 
contracting officer was not prohibited from considering a proper 
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request, but the court concluded that the contracting officer’s belief 
to the contrary was not a prejudicial error, since Tip Top had not 
made a proper, formal request to substitute assets.226  Instead,  
Tip Top had only told the contracting officer that its surety had other 
assets available without ever actually offering them in writing for 
substitution.227  “Because there was no formal request by the surety to 
provide a substitute asset, there was no formal rejection of an offer 
for substitution, and the contracting officer’s purported 
misunderstanding of FAR 28.203-4 is irrelevant.”228 
II. FRAUD 
A. Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co. v. United States229 
The Federal Circuit in 2009 issued its much anticipated opinion in 
Daewoo Engineering and Construction Co. v. United States, which involved 
one of the largest judgments ever reported under the anti-fraud 
provision of the CDA.230  The decision in Daewoo is important not only 
for the size of the judgment, but also because the factual basis for the 
judgment amount remains unclear.  Although Daewoo involves 
egregious conduct that any responsible contractor would know not to 
repeat, the line drawn between the amount of Daewoo’s claim that 
was fraudulent and the amount that was not fraudulent continues to 
raise more questions than it answers.  
Daewoo involved a contract with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to 
construct a road in the Republic of Palau.231  Daewoo maintained that 
the Government was liable for delays and additional costs associated 
with Daewoo’s inability to compact soil to the density required by the 
contract to construct the road.232  Daewoo submitted a certified claim 
under the CDA that asserted two principal theories of entitlement.233  
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 227. See id. (concluding that the e-mail “merely referred somewhat obliquely” to 
the existence of other assets and finding that the telephone call was not a valid 
request). 
 228. Id. 
 229. 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Daewoo II). 
 230. 41 U.S.C. § 604 (2006). 
 231. Daewoo II, 557 F.3d at 1334.   
 232. Id.; Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo I), 73 Fed. Cl. 547, 
561–68 (2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing Daewoo’s arguments 
relying on weather-related claims and defective design).  The principal technical 
requirement in the contract was the construction of embankments to support the 
road.  Daewoo I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 551.  This task required the successive compaction of 
layers of soil to a certain density.  Id.  Because of the moist soil, humid weather, and 
amount of rainfall in Palau, however, Daewoo experienced problems in achieving 
the required density.  Id.; Daewoo II, 557 F.3d at 1334. 
 233. Daewoo II, 557 F.3d at 1334. 
  
1022 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:991 
First, the contract included a Weather Clause in order to determine 
Daewoo’s entitlement to delay for unusually severe weather, which set 
the baseline against which actual weather would be measured.234  
Daewoo argued that the baseline misrepresented the number of days 
out of the year that it would not be able to work due to rainfall.235  
Second, Daewoo argued that the compaction specification was 
defective and that performance of that specification was 
impracticable.236  
Daewoo sought a contract extension of 928 days, as well as $13.3 
million in costs that allegedly had been incurred as of December 
2001.237  The claim also identified $50.6 million as an “estimate[] of 
future cost . . . anticipated to be incurred,” which was “provided as a 
guide to the Government for considering alternate specifications”—
i.e., if the Government did not permit use of an alternative 
embankment construction method.238  Daewoo’s calculation of its 
claim is important to understand because this calculation became the 
basis for the judgment against Daewoo.  Essentially, Daewoo 
determined that, absent further relaxation of the Contract’s 
embankment specification, the contract would require an additional 
928 days to complete.239  Daewoo’s claim estimated that it had 
experienced 153 days of delay, and that the remaining 775 days of 
delay would occur in the future.240  Daewoo calculated an average 
monthly cost based on the last three months of 2001, and then 
applied that monthly average to the projected additional 25.5 months 
(775 days), thus reaching a $50.6 million estimate of future cost.241  
The Government counterclaimed, alleging violations of the False 
Claims Act242 and section 604 of the CDA,243 common law fraud in the 
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inducement, and also seeking forfeiture of Daewoo’s claims pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2514.244  The COFC rejected both of Daewoo’s theories 
of entitlement and found in favor of the Government on each of its 
counterclaims.245  The court held that there was no defect in the 
weather clause and that this clause did not “create an implied 
warranty of future weather.”246  The weather experienced by Daewoo 
was largely to be expected in Palau, and, in any event, the court 
found that Daewoo did not rely on the contract’s weather clause but 
instead conducted its own analysis.247  With respect to the alleged 
defective soil specification, the court concluded that the density 
requirement was a performance specification, not a design 
specification, and therefore carried no implied warranty as to its 
achievability.248  Moreover, the court found that the contract’s 
required density was not impossible, that Daewoo itself had achieved 
the required density in tests, and that Daewoo failed to employ 
known methods and management decisions that could have achieved 
that required density in the field.249   
With respect to the Government’s counterclaims, the court held 
Daewoo liable for violations of the False Claims Act and the anti-fraud 
provision of the CDA.250  False Claims Act liability was based on a 
number of factors, and the COFC recited a laundry list of 
inaccuracies and misrepresentations:  Daewoo used a baseline 
productivity rate that was thirty-three percent higher than its original 
bid rate in calculating its loss of productivity;251 the claim included 
                                                 
 244. Daewoo II, 557 F.3d at 1334; Daewoo Eng’g & Construction Co. v. United 
States (Daewoo I), 73 Fed. Cl. 547, 581–88 (2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  Notably, the Government sought leave to assert these counterclaims after 
Daewoo presented its case in chief during trial.  Daewoo I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 581–82.  The 
court allowed the amendment, finding that “[t]he evidence of fraud arose from and 
during the testimony of plaintiff’s own witnesses, during its case-in-chief.”  Id. at 582.   
 245. Daewoo I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 597. 
 246. Id. at 563. 
 247. Id. at 558, 561, 563–64. 
 248. Id. at 566–68. 
 249. Id. at 568. 
 250. Id. at 584–85.  The Government also had counterclaims under the Forfeiture 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2514, and for fraud in the inducement.  Id. at 584, 586.  For the 
same reasons that the Court found liability under the False Claims Act and the CDA, 
the Court determined that Daewoo had practiced fraud within the meaning of the 
Forfeiture statute.  Id. at 584.  However, this counterclaim was inapplicable because 
Daewoo’s claims were rejected—there was nothing for Daewoo to forfeit.  Id.   
The COFC also ruled in favor of the Government on its fraud in the inducement 
counterclaim, finding that Daewoo had made several misrepresentations during the 
procurement of the contract.  Id. at 586–88.  As with the False Claims Act 
counterclaim, the Court was unable to assign actual damages to the Government’s 
fraud in the inducement counterclaim.  Id. at 588. 
 251. Id. at 578, 592. 
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costs for certain items of equipment twice;252 the claim included costs 
that the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) had found 
unallowable in earlier claims;253 and the claim included scrapped 
equipment or equipment depreciated beyond its acquisition cost.254  
Moreover, Daewoo relied on published sample average equipment 
ownership and expense rates instead of actual rates.255  In rejecting 
Daewoo’s argument that the above-referenced matters were “honest 
mistakes,” the COFC stated that “all Daewoo’s ‘errors’ in the claim 
increased the amount of the claim; no errors had the effect of 
reducing the claim.”256  Ultimately, however, the COFC was unable to 
determine that the Government had suffered actual damages, and 
therefore assessed only one $10,000 penalty against Daewoo under 
the False Claim Act.257  
The COFC’s inability to quantify the Government’s actual damages 
did not limit Daewoo’s liability under section 604 of the CDA, which 
provides: 
If a contractor is unable to support any part of his claim and it is 
determined that such inability is attributable to misrepresentation 
of fact or fraud on the part of the contractor, he shall be liable to 
the Government for an amount equal to such unsupported part of 
the claim . . . .258 
By its terms, a contractor’s liability under section 604 is measured by 
the amount of the claim that is “unsupported” because of fraud, 
rather than the amount of any actual damages sustained by the 
Government.259   
Daewoo’s liability under the CDA was based largely on its finding 
that Daewoo’s certified claim was a negotiating ploy: 
                                                 
 252. Id. at 583, 592 n.79. 
 253. Id. at 593. 
 254. Id. at 592.   
 255. Id. at 591–92. 
 256. Id. at 593.  The COFC’s findings were driven by the court’s conclusion that 
Daewoo’s witnesses lacked credibility:  “Nothing about the case was so disturbing as 
the performance of plaintiff’s witnesses, however, particularly with regard to 
credibility.”  Id. at 569.  The COFC also found that “Daewoo damaged its case by 
obvious efforts to coach and lead the witnesses.”  Id. at 561.  Most disturbing to the 
COFC was the testimony of plaintiff’s expert witnesses from Exponent.   
The Government’s certified fraud examiner “testified that Exponent’s behavior in 
this case was at best ‘professionally irresponsible.’  Certainly, their testimony during 
trial and in plaintiff’s rebuttal case did nothing to dispel that appraisal for the court.”  
Id. at 572. 
 257. Id. at 585, 597. 
 258. 41 U.S.C. § 604 (2006); see also id. § 601(9) (“‘[M]isrepresentation of fact’ 
means a false statement of substantive fact, or any conduct which leads to a belief of a 
substantive fact material to proper understanding of the matter in hand, made with 
intent to deceive or mislead.”). 
 259. See Daewoo I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 584–85. 
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The Government proved by any standard that Daewoo’s $64 
million claim was fraudulent.  Plaintiff made the claim for purposes 
other than a good faith belief that the Government owed Daewoo 
that amount.  Plaintiff in fact did not believe that the Government 
owed it $64 million as a matter of right.260 
The COFC found that the $50.6 million future cost estimate was 
included simply to indicate “the seriousness of the situation” and to 
convince the Government to allow Daewoo to use a different method 
of constructing the embankments.261  Because the claim was nothing 
more than a negotiating ploy, the COFC found it was evidence of 
fraudulent intent and that the claim was submitted “for a reason 
other than an attempt to recover money for which Daewoo believed 
the Government is liable,” in violation of the CDA.262   
Although suspecting that the entire claim was fraudulent, the 
COFC stated that “[i]t is theoretically possible that plaintiff’s $13 
million claim represents an amount that it could have incurred 
because of defective specifications, had such a theory been 
applicable.”263  Instead, the COFC ruled that “[t]he ‘part of [the] 
claim’ that is fraudulent without question is $50,629,855.88,” i.e., the 
amount identified in the claim as “to be incurred after December 31, 
2001.”264  A penalty of $50.6 million (instead of $64 million) was 
therefore assessed against Daewoo.265 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Daewoo challenged every aspect 
of the COFC’s ruling, including the denial of Daewoo’s claims, and 
each of its challenges were rejected.266  Daewoo first argued that CDA 
liability did not attach because it did not certify a “claim” for  
$64 million, asserting that the $50.6 million future costs were “merely 
estimates provided to encourage the government to adjust the 
contract specifications.”267  The Federal Circuit acknowledged that 
Daewoo’s claim was “unclear” as to whether it sought the entire  
$64 million as a matter of right.268  Because of that ambiguity, 
however, the Court determined that the question was a factual one, 
to be resolved the same way that an ambiguity in a contract is 
                                                 
 260. Id. at 585. 
 261. Id.  
 262. Id. at 584–85; see also id. at 570, 590, 597. 
 263. Id. at 596. 
 264. Id. at 595. 
 265. Id. at 597. 
 266. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo II), 557 F.3d 1332, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 267. Id. at 1336. 
 268. Id. at 1337. 
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resolved—by resorting to extrinsic evidence.269  The Federal Circuit 
deferred to Judge Hodges’s factual finding that Daewoo submitted a 
$64 million claim, observing that that finding was supported by 
Daewoo’s complaint and by testimony of Daewoo’s own witnesses.270   
Daewoo next argued that, even if it had certified a $64 million 
claim, the $50.6 million figure did not reflect any amount that was 
“unsupported” because of the fraud.271  As noted above, the COFC 
stated that it “suspect[ed] that Daewoo’s entire claim [was] 
fraudulent,” but conceded that that “[i]t is theoretically possible” that 
the $13 million in costs allegedly incurred prior to December 31, 
2001, was legitimate, had the defective specification argument been 
valid.272  Daewoo thus argued that, assuming there was a non-
fraudulent (even if unproved) claim for costs incurred before 
December 2001, there could not also have been a fraudulent claim 
for costs to be incurred after 2001.273  Because both the “incurred” 
and “future” portions of the claim were based on the same legal 
theories, Daewoo argued, the COFC’s ruling that all future costs were 
fraudulently claimed was inconsistent with that court’s holding that 
all incurred costs were not.274  The Government, by contrast, argued 
that the entire claim was fraudulent and that the COFC’s lesser 
judgment was “a perverse reward for the incomprehensible nature of 
[Daewoo’s] claim.”275 
The Federal Circuit addressed these arguments by drawing a 
distinction not readily apparent from the COFC’s opinion between 
the underlying legal theories of Daewoo’s claim on one hand, and 
the calculation of the different categories of costs on the other.276  
According to the Federal Circuit, “[t]he Court of Federal Claims did 
not find that Daewoo’s theories of the government’s breach of the 
contract . . . were fraudulent (though it ultimately found these 
theories to be without merit).  Rather, the Court of Federal Claims 
found that Daewoo’s $50.6 million projected cost calculation was 
                                                 
 269. Id. at 1337, 1337 n.3. 
 270. Id. at 1337–38. 
 271. Id. at 1338. 
 272. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo I), 73 Fed. Cl. 547, 
595–96 (2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 273. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. at 9–10, 
Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)  
(No. 07-5129).  
 274. Id. at 10. 
 275. Brief for Defendant-Appellee United States at 31, Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. 
Co. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 07-5129). 
 276. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo II), 557 F.3d 1332, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
  
2010] 2009 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS 1027 
fraudulent.”277  The Federal Circuit agreed that the projected cost 
calculation was fraudulent because (1) Daewoo failed to consider 
contractor-caused delay and improperly assumed that the 
Government was responsible for each day of delay; (2) Daewoo 
assumed that current daily expenditures represented costs for which 
the Government was responsible; and (3) Daewoo used no outside 
experts to prepare its claim, and its trial experts “treated the certified 
claim computation as essentially worthless, did not utilize it, and did 
not even bother to understand it.”278 
The Federal Circuit also agreed that the cost projection was a 
“negotiating ploy,” but did not base its fraud determination solely on 
that fact.279  The Federal Circuit accepted the COFC’s finding that the 
$50.6 million future cost portion of the claim was not submitted  
“in good faith” and that the amount did not “accurately reflect[] the 
contract adjustment for which the Contractor believes the 
Government is liable,” both of which are required by 41 U.S.C.  
§ 605(c)(1).280  The Federal Circuit noted that “Congress specifically 
enacted the fraud provision of the Contract Disputes Act ‘out of 
concern that the submission of baseless claims contribute[s] to the 
so-called horsetrading theory where an amount beyond that which 
can be legitimately claimed is submitted merely as a negotiating 
tactic.’”281  
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Daewoo’s argument that the 
$50.6 million judgment violated the Constitution because it was 
disproportionate to any actual damages sustained by the 
Government.282  The panel reasoned that a judgment need only be 
proportionate to the “possible harm resulting from the conduct,”  
and that “[h]ere the potential harm was Daewoo’s securing a  
$50.6 million payment from the government.”283  According to the 
Federal Circuit, the “harm likely to result”284 from a fraudulent claim 
is the amount that the Government would have overpaid because of 
the fraud.285   
                                                 
 277. Id. (emphasis added). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 1339. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 1340 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 20 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5254). 
 282. Id. at 1340. 
 283. Id. (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)). 
 284. See id. (citing  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996)) 
(explaining that the fraud’s low likelihood of success did not mean the penalty was 
inappropriate). 
 285. Id.  
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Although Daewoo definitively resolves the constitutional question 
whether judgments under § 604 of the CDA depend on the extent to 
which the Government suffers actual damages, the opinion raises 
more questions than it answers.  The primary questions concern the 
manner in which liability was calculated.  Under previous decisions, 
the Government’s remedy under § 604 of the CDA was calculated by 
adding up all the unsupported elements of the claim.286  In UMC 
Electronics Co. v. United States,287 for example, the contractor used 
purchase order costs rather than actual invoice costs to calculate its 
claim, knowing that its actual costs were lower.288  The remedy in that 
case was the amount of the claim that was unsupported—the 
difference between the purchase order costs and the actual invoice 
costs.289  
In Daewoo, by contrast, the COFC drew an apparently arbitrary line 
between the $13.3 million that Daewoo claimed as incurred costs, 
and the $50.6 million claimed as future costs.290  The COFC held that 
the latter was the unsupported part of the claim,291 and the Federal 
Circuit upheld this finding.292  It does not appear, however, that the 
Government ever established that the specific inaccuracies and 
misrepresentations in Daewoo’s claim totaled $50.6 million.   
For example, although the Federal Circuit believed that Daewoo’s 
calculation failed to consider contractor-caused delay, neither the 
Federal Circuit nor the court quantified the impact of that failure.293  
Similarly, the Federal Circuit believed that Daewoo included costs for 
which the Government was not responsible.294  The judgment against 
Daewoo, however, was for all estimated future costs—not simply the 
costs that the Federal Circuit or COFC believed should not have been 
included.295   
Moreover, neither the Federal Circuit nor the COFC addressed 
Daewoo’s subsequent efforts to support its claim at trial.  Daewoo 
hired a cost expert who prepared a revised quantum calculation, after 
the claim’s initial submission, that resulted in a claim of $29 million 
                                                 
 286. See 41 U.S.C. § 604 (2006). 
 287. 249 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 288. Id. at 1339–40. 
 289. Id. at 1340; UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 776, 821 (1999). 
 290. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo I), 73 Fed. Cl. 547, 596 
(2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 291. Id. at 597. 
 292. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo II), 557 F.3d 1332, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 293. Id. at 1338. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 1339. 
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rather than the $64 million originally claimed.296  Neither the COFC 
nor the Federal Circuit, however, addressed whether that subsequent 
effort “supported” some part of the $50.6 million that was otherwise 
considered “unsupported.”297 
Yet another problematic aspect of the Federal Circuit’s opinion is 
its reference to Daewoo’s claim as a “negotiating ploy.”298  Unlike the 
COFC’s opinion, the negotiating ploy rationale is not the primary 
basis for liability in the Federal Circuit’s analysis.  Instead, the Federal 
Circuit was primarily concerned with the manner in which the $50.6 
million estimate of future costs was calculated.299  The evidence that 
Daewoo submitted the claim in order to “get the government’s 
attention” and convince them to change the soil specification appears 
to have been considered as evidence of Daewoo’s fraudulent intent, 
rather than evidence of the underlying overstatement of the amount 
to which Daewoo was entitled.300   
This distinction, however, is not explicit in the Federal Circuit’s 
opinion, which could lead some to argue that the negotiating ploy 
rationale provides an independent basis of liability.  In other words, 
Daewoo may prompt the Government to argue that a contractor 
violates § 604 of the CDA every time it submits a monetary claim with 
the unstated objective of obtaining some other, non-monetary relief.  
That cannot be a correct application of the CDA, as the legislative 
history quoted in the court’s opinion makes clear; Congress’s 
concern with “horsetrading” was the situation “where an amount 
beyond that which can be legitimately claimed is submitted merely as 
a negotiating tactic.’”301  The Government therefore must first show 
that the contractor claimed “an amount beyond that which can be 
legitimately claimed.”302 This question must be answered before 
offering evidence of why this higher amount was claimed, and 
whether the claim was a negotiating tactic.  
Indeed, many contractors submitting a claim would prefer a 
negotiated solution in which the Government stops or corrects 
                                                 
 296. Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States (Daewoo I), 73 Fed. Cl. 547, 573, 
580–81, 589–90 (2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   
 297. The COFC questioned the revised calculation and the professionalism of 
Daewoo’s expert, id. at 580–81, but ultimately declined to address this issue because 
the approach used by the expert was used in the certified claim presented to the 
contracting officer, id. at 590–91.   
 298. Daewoo II, 557 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 1340 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 20 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5254). 
 302. Id. 
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whatever conduct the contractor complains of in the claim.  Pointing 
out that the Government can avoid the full estimate of future 
damages claimed by altering its conduct is not necessarily an 
improper “negotiating ploy”—it simply states the truism that a 
breaching party can mitigate its own damages by ceasing the conduct 
that constitutes the breach.  As a result, if the claim amount  
is legitimately calculated, the fact that the contractor prefers  
non-monetary relief should be irrelevant.  Unfortunately, the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion was less than clear on this point, which may lead to 
allegations of fraud resting entirely on the negotiating ploy rationale. 
III. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE DISPUTES 
A. Jurisdiction 
The Federal Circuit issued two precedential opinions concerning 
the jurisdiction of the Boards and the COFC to hear contract 
disputes under the CDA.303  In Winter v. FloorPro, Inc.,304 the court 
continued its practice of strictly construing jurisdictional statutes 
containing a waiver of sovereign immunity, holding that the ASBCA 
does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal under the CDA by a 
third party beneficiary to a government contract.305  By contrast, in a 
matter of first impression, the Federal Circuit ruled in Arctic Slope 
Native Ass’n v. Sebelius306 that the six-year jurisdictional limitations 
period for CDA claims was subject to equitable tolling.307 
1. Winter v. FloorPro, Inc. 
The claimant in Winter v. FloorPro was a subcontractor to G.M. & W. 
Construction Corp. (“GM & W”), a minority-owned business 
qualifying under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, to install 
floor coating at warehouse bays on a military base.308  FloorPro 
completed the contract work and submitted an invoice to GM & W 
but did not receive payment.309  The Government then agreed to 
modify the contract “to specify that the government would issue a 
                                                 
 303. 41 U.S.C. § 607(d) (2006) (granting jurisdiction over contract disputes to the 
Boards of Contract Appeals); id. § 609(a) (granting jurisdiction over contract 
disputes to the COFC); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (2006) (granting jurisdiction over 
non-CDA breach of contract actions to the COFC).   
 304. 570 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 305. Id. at 1370, 1373. 
 306. 583 F.3d 785 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 307. Id. at 788. 
 308. FloorPro, 570 F.3d at 1368. 
 309. Id. 
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two-party check made payable to both FloorPro and GM & W.”310  
Nonetheless, the Government paid GM & W directly.311  FloorPro 
later filed a claim with the CO for payment based on the 
Government’s failure to follow the terms of the contract 
modification.312  The CO refused to issue a decision on the claim 
because the Government did not have a contract with FloorPro.313  
FloorPro then filed an appeal at the ASBCA.314 
On a motion to dismiss and later summary judgment motion, the 
ASBCA found that FloorPro could bring an appeal under the CDA as 
an intended third party beneficiary to the contract modification.315  
While acknowledging that FloorPro was not in privity of contract with 
the Government, the ASBCA relied on D & H Distributing Co. v. 
United States316 to conclude that a third party beneficiary to a 
government contract could bring an appeal to the Board under the 
CDA.317  The Board granted summary judgment for FloorPro for the 
full $37,500 sought.318  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that the CDA applied 
only to “contractors” as defined in the Act—“a party to a Government 
contract other than the Government.”319  In addition, the CDA 
applies only to “express or implied contract[s] . . . entered into by an 
executive agency.”320  The Federal Circuit held that the CDA did not 
include an exception to permit appeals by third party beneficiaries.321  
The Federal Circuit also distinguished D & H Distributing because the 
subcontractor in that case brought the claim at the COFC under the 
Tucker Act rather than the CDA.322  As such, the court in D & H 
Distributing “was not interpreting or applying the CDA’s provision that 
only ‘contractors’ may appeal to agency boards of appeals.”323  
                                                 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 1369. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. In re FloorPro, Inc., ASBCA No. 54143, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32571 (2004) (FloorPro I) 
(denying the government’s motion to dismiss); In re FloorPro, Inc., ASBCA No. 
54143, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33615 (2007) (FloorPro II), aff’d on reconsideration, In re FloorPro, 
Inc., ASBCA No. 54143, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33793 (2008) (FloorPro III) (granting summary 
judgment in favor of appellant).   
 316. 102 F.3d 542, 547–48 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a third party beneficiary 
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 317. FloorPro I, ASBCA No. 54143, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32571.  
 318. FloorPro II, ASBCA No. 54143, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33615. 
 319. FloorPro, 570 F.3d at 1369–70 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 601(4) (2006)). 
 320. 41 U.S.C. § 602(a). 
 321. FloorPro, 570 F.3d at 1371. 
 322. Id. at 1372. 
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Because FloorPro was not in privity with the Government, and 
because there is no exception to the CDA’s requirement that only 
“contractors” may bring an appeal under the Act, the Federal Circuit 
held that the ASBCA did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.324  
The Federal Circuit therefore vacated the Board’s decision with 
instructions to dismiss the appeal.325  
2. Arctic Slope Native Ass’n v. Sebelius 
As noted above, Arctic Slope finally provided the Federal Circuit an 
opportunity to address whether the CDA’s six-year limitations period 
is subject to equitable tolling.326  Parties to prior appeals had raised 
the issue, but those appeals were disposed of on other grounds.327  
Although the case involves a unique statutory scheme and facts that 
are uncommon to most CDA appeals, the Federal Circuit 
nevertheless definitively resolved the question by stating that “we do 
not agree that the limitations period in section 605(a) is absolute and 
not subject to equitable tolling.”328   
In Arctic Slope, Indian tribes and tribal organizations brought claims 
under the CDA related to contracts with the Indian Health Service 
(IHS) to provide health care services to their tribe members.329   
The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) dismissed several of 
the claims because they were not filed within six years of accrual as 
required by section 605(a) of the CDA.330  The CBCA held that the 
CDA’s presentment restriction was a jurisdictional requirement that 
was not subject to either equitable or legal tolling.331  On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit found that, while the CDA’s six-year presentment 
period is not subject to legal tolling as a result of class action 
litigation, it is subject to equitable tolling.332  The Federal Circuit 
remanded the claims to the CBCA to determine whether they 
satisfied the requirements for equitable tolling.333   
                                                 
 324. Id. at 1372–73. 
 325. Id. at 1373. 
 326. Arctic Slope Native Ass’n v. Sebelius, 583 F.3d 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 327. See, e.g., Bonneville Assocs. v. Barram, 165 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
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The contracts at issue are “self-determination contracts” authorized 
by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
(ISDA).334  Under these contracts, the tribes administer programs 
previously provided by the federal government and receive the same 
amount of funding that the government would have appropriated for 
the programs if it continued to operate them directly.335  Among 
other things, the 1988 amendments to the ISDA required the 
Government to pay administrative expenses associated with the  
self-determination contracts, including “contract support costs” that 
the federal government would not have incurred by directly 
providing the services.336  The ISDA amendments also applied the 
CDA to disputes arising under those contracts and permitted 
contractors to bring claims in what is now the CBCA, the COFC,  
or district courts.337  Beginning in 1999, several ISDA contractors filed 
class action suits against the Government for allegedly failing to fully 
fund contract support costs on self-determination contracts.338   
The district courts ultimately denied class certification.339  In 2005, the 
Arctic Slope Native Association (ASNA) filed CDA claims seeking 
contract support costs on its IHS contracts for fiscal years 1996 
through 2000, while asserting that it was a member of the putative 
class in one of the pending class actions.340  Even though the claims 
were filed outside the CDA’s six-year presentment period, the ASNA 
argued that the filing period was legally tolled until the class 
certification was denied or, alternatively, should be tolled for 
equitable reasons.341  The CBCA dismissed the claims for lack of 
jurisdiction, holding that it did not have jurisdiction over claims that 
were not filed within the CDA’s six-year window.342 
The Federal Circuit rejected the Government’s argument that the 
CDA’s time limitation could not be tolled because it is 
“jurisdictional.”343  However, the plaintiffs were not eligible for class 
action tolling because, even if the class had been certified, they would 
not have been eligible to be class members because they failed to 
present their CDA claims to a CO within six years of accrual.344   
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In addition, the Federal Circuit noted that applying class action 
tolling in this case would have placed the plaintiffs—putative class 
members—in a better position than if they had been named parties 
in the class action litigation.345  As named parties, their claims would 
have been dismissed for failure to comply with the CDA’s 
presentment requirement.346  Nonetheless, when it examined the 
issue of equitable tolling, the Federal Circuit concluded that it was 
required to apply the rebuttable presumption of Irwin v. Department of 
Veterans Affairs347 that “equitable tolling applicable to suits against 
private defendants should also apply to suits against the United 
States[,]” such as those authorized by the CDA.348  The Federal Circuit 
therefore remanded for the CBCA to determine whether the 
limitations period should be equitably tolled.349  To date, neither the 
COFC nor the boards of contract appeals have relied on Arctic Slope to 
support equitable tolling of a CDA claim that was not presented 
within six years of accrual.  
B. Contract Interpretation 
The Federal Circuit in 2009 continued to decide appeals involving 
questions of contract interpretation according to the “plain meaning” 
of the contract language at issue, and concluded in several cases that 
this plain meaning had eluded the lower tribunal.  The plain 
meaning rule applied by the Federal Circuit can be stated as follows:  
“[When] the provisions of the Agreement are phrased in clear and 
unambiguous language, they must be given their plain and ordinary 
meaning, and we may not resort to extrinsic evidence to interpret 
them.”350  The Federal Circuit’s application of this rule has been 
criticized for departing from the common law of contracts, which 
ostensibly controls absent statutory or regulatory instruction 
otherwise.351  The plain meaning rule, however, continues to drive the 
Federal Circuit’s analysis of contract disputes.   
                                                 
 345. Id. at 796. 
 346. Id. 
 347. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).  
 348. Arctic Slope, 583 F.3d at 798 (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96). 
 349. Id. at 800. 
 350. Coast Fed. Bank v. United States, 323 F.3d 1035, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2003)  
(en banc). 
 351.  See Winstar v. United States, 518 U.S. 839, 887 (1996) (referring to plain 
meaning as the “unmistakability doctrine” and holding that the Federal Circuit 
correctly deferred to normal contract principles when enforcing the government 
contract at issue); see also Mobil Oil Exploration v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 608 
(2000) (“The Restatement of Contracts reflects many of the principles of contract 
law that are applicable to this action.”).  See generally W. Stanfield Johnson, Interpreting 
Government Contracts:  Plain Meaning Precludes Extrinsic Evidence and Controls at the 
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1. Bell BCI Co. v. United States352 
Perhaps the most surprising decision of the year in this regard was 
Bell BCI Co. v. United States, where a divided panel of the court ruled 
that boilerplate release language in a bilateral modification barred a 
contractor’s claims for the cumulative and disruptive impact of 
multiple change orders.353  Over a vigorous dissent, the panel majority 
held that the release language unambiguously discharged claims for 
cumulative impact and disruption, notwithstanding (1) the absence 
of any reference to “cumulative impact” or “disruption” in the 
modification,354 (2) the Government’s failure to introduce any 
evidence that the parties intended to release such claims,355 and  
(3) the trial court’s findings to the contrary.356  The majority held 
these claims were barred notwithstanding the fact that the full 
disruptive impact of the change orders was not known at the time the 
modification was executed.  Indeed, this could not have been known 
given that the contractors’ claim was for the cumulative impact of 
multiple change orders, many of which had not yet been issued when 
the modification was signed.357   
Bell BCI involved the construction of a laboratory building at the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, Maryland.358  
Approximately nine months into construction, NIH decided to add a 
new floor to the building.359 NIH issued more than 200 contract 
modifications that delayed the completion of the project by nineteen 
and a half months and increased the contract price by thirty-four 
percent.360  The Government and the prime contractor negotiated 
numerous modifications addressing the direct impact of many 
change orders with the following release language:  “This 
modification provides for full compensation for the changed work, 
including both Contract cost and Contract time.  The Contractor 
                                                 
Federal Circuit, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 635 (2005) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s 
application of the plain meaning rule as inconsistent with the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts). 
 352. 570 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Bell BCI II). 
 353. Id. at 1341. 
 354. See id. at 1339 (quoting the modification language). 
 355. Bell BCI Co. v. United States (Bell BCI I), 81 Fed. Cl. 617, 639 (2008), aff’d in 
part,vacated in part, 570 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Bell BCI, 570 F.3d at 1344 
(Newman, J., dissenting).   
 356. Bell BCI II, 570 F.3d at 1344; Bell BCI I, 81 Fed. Cl. at 639–40. 
 357. Bell BCI II, 570 F.3d at 1339 (noting that the Government issued 113 
additional modifications to the contract incorporating 216 changes to the contract’s 
scope of work, and that an additional fifty-eight changes were issued but never 
incorporated into a modification). 
 358. Id. at 1338. 
 359. Id. at 1339.  
 360. Id. at 1339, 1342; Bell BCI I, 81 Fed. Cl. at 618–19. 
  
1036 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:991 
hereby releases the Government from any and all liability under the 
Contract for further equitable adjustment attributable to the 
Modification.”361  Following contract completion, the prime 
contractor submitted a claim for the cumulative impact of the 
multiple change orders issued by the Government, which the CO 
denied.362   
The COFC ruled in favor of the prime contractor, holding that the 
“[Government’s] accord and satisfaction defense [was] without 
merit.”363  The COFC discussed the “clear distinction in the law” 
between claims for the cost of performing changed work and claims 
for the effect of multiple changes on unchanged work.364  The COFC 
held that the release language did not bar the latter type of claim, 
reasoning that (1) “[n]one of the contract modifications included 
any payment to Bell for cumulative impact or labor inefficiency”;  
(2) “Bell did not expressly release its cumulative impact claim in any 
modification”; (3) “the release language does not address cumulative 
impact claims”; and (4) the releases “preceded many of the events 
giving rise to the claim.”365  The COFC further observed that the 
Government offered no evidence to support its assertion that the 
parties intended to bar cumulative impact and disruption claims.366  
In fact, the Government declined to offer any testimony from the CO 
who signed the modifications and who presumably was in the best 
position to know what the Government understood the release 
language to cover.367  The COFC inferred that the CO’s testimony 
would not have supported the Government’s position.368   
As discussed above, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed 
the COFC, holding that the release language unambiguously covered 
“any and all liability . . . attributable to” the modifications containing 
the release language.369  The majority reasoned that, although “there 
may be ambiguity as to which claims are ‘attributable to’ a given 
modification, . . . we cannot glean any ambiguity about which types of 
claims are released.”370  Accordingly, the majority held that the release 
encompassed cumulative impact claims to the extent they were 
“attributable to” modifications containing the release, and remanded 
                                                 
 361. Bell BCI II, 570 F.3d at 1339. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Bell BCI I, 81 Fed. Cl. at 619.  
 364. Id. at 639. 
 365. Id. at 619. 
 366. Id. at 619–20, 639. 
 367. Id. at 639.   
 368. Id. 
 369. Bell BCI II, 570 F.3d at 1341. 
 370. Id. 
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the case to the COFC to “determine which of Bell’s cumulative 
impact claims, if any, are ‘attributable to’ modifications other than 
those modifications that contain the release language.”371   
Judge Newman dissented, arguing that “[t]his case is a compelling 
illustration of why appellate tribunals should give due weight to the 
attributes and benefits of the process of trial, for such processes 
enable the trial judge to dig deeply into the events, to figure out what 
happened and what was intended, and to reach a just result.”372   
Judge Newman disagreed with the view that the contract was 
unambiguous, noting that “[a]n accord does not arise until there is a 
dispute.”373  Judge Newman concluded that the release language  
“did not produce an ‘accord and satisfaction’ of unforeseen claims 
arising from unforeseen and unintended events.”374   
As Judge Newman pointed out, the majority’s ruling is in tension 
with the well-established rule that a general release does not operate 
to extinguish claims which were not known and could not have been 
known at the time the release was executed.375  Although parties to a 
contract are free to release each other from liability for unknown 
claims, this general rule reasonably requires specific contract 
language or evidence that the parties intended such a result.  In the 
wake of Bell BCI, contractors must now expressly reserve their rights 
to cumulative impact and disruption claims in all bilateral 
modifications containing boilerplate releases, if such claims are 
possible.  However, given that the scope of such claims is usually 
never known with any degree of certainty until later in contract 
performance, insisting on such reservations will undoubtedly 
complicate and delay the negotiation of timely change orders, 
frustrating the very purpose of the “Changes Clause.” 
                                                 
 371. Id. at 1342. 
 372. Id. at 1343 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 373. Id. at 1346. 
 374. Id. 
 375. See, e.g., Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. United States,  
531 F.2d 1037, 1047 (Ct. Cl. 1976)) (“The rule for releases is that . . . a general 
release bars claims based on events occurring prior to the date of the release”).  “The 
test is not the state of the plaintiff’s knowledge, but the availability of information 
which, properly digested, could reasonably be expected to acquaint plaintiff with the 
existence of a reimbursable cost.”  Johnson, Drake, & Piper, 531 F.2d at 1048 (quoting 
U.S. Rubber Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 492, 496 (Ct. Cl. 1958)).  It follows 
that “the critical inquiry in determining whether a release operates on a particular 
claim or right is whether the claim or right can be said to exist such that a party is 
capable of waiving or preserving it.”  76 C.J.S. Release § 76 (2007). 
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2. LAI Services, Inc. v. Gates376 
In LAI Services, Inc. v. Gates, the Federal Circuit’s plain meaning 
approach to contract interpretation resulted in a partial victory for 
both sides.  The Court held that the plain language of the contract 
supported the contractor’s contention as to what contract line-item 
number (CLIN) controlled billing and payment for certain work.377  
By contrast, the Court held that the same plain language supported 
the Government’s argument as to how payment under that CLIN 
would be made.378 
The contract at issue required LAI Services to provide material 
distribution services to the Defense Distribution Depot in San Diego, 
California (DDDC).379  Under the Contract, “[LAI] was required to 
receive, label, pack, store and deliver various items to meet military 
needs both on-base and off-base.”380  The Contract provided separate 
prices for individual CLINs corresponding to each of the tasks 
required by the statement of work.381   
The dispute in LAI Services turned on which CLIN governed 
payment for a particular task, known as “minimum military packing 
[‘MMP’] of off-base transhipments,” and how payment would be 
made.382  From its first invoice, LAI billed under CLIN 0002 for MMP 
of off-base transshipments.383  CLIN 0002 had a unit price of $25.34 
and stated that billing should be “per each,” which LAI took to mean 
it should bill on a per-item basis.384  The government’s position was 
that MMP transshipments should be billed under CLIN 0001 at a  
unit price of $5.87, with billing and payment on a per-line basis.385   
Thus, the government denied a portion of the charges on LAI’s 
invoice.386  The CO denied in its entirety LAI’s certified claim for the 
difference between what it had invoiced under CLIN 0002 and what 
                                                 
 376. 573 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 377. Id. at 1314–15. 
 378. Id. at 1317. 
 379. Id. at 1308. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id.  “Under the contract, LAI packed both ‘mission stock’ and 
‘transshipments.’”  Id.  “‘Mission stock’ items were items owned and stored by DDDC 
itself,” whereas “‘transshipments’ referred to items sent from another organization to 
DDDC, then quickly processed and sent to a second military entity.”  Id. at 1308–09.  
“Items could be sent to locations at DDDC, or to locations off-base.”  Id. at 1309.  
Further, different items had different packaging needs, and “minimum military 
packing” (MMP) was the simplest form of packing designed for typical commercial 
shipping environments.  Id. 
 383. Id. at 1309. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
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the Government had paid under CLIN 0001.387  The ASBCA agreed 
with the CO, concluding that the contract was patently ambiguous 
and that LAI’s failure to ascertain the correct interpretation prior to 
contract award defeated its claim.388  Alternatively, the ASBCA ruled 
that, even if the ambiguity were latent, LAI’s interpretation was not 
reasonable, and that LAI had not established that it relied on its 
interpretation at the time it entered into the contract.389 
On appeal, the Court addressed two issues:  (1) whether MMP for 
off-base transshipments were covered by CLIN 0001 or 0002; and  
(2) if covered by CLIN 002, whether “per each” meant that payment 
would be made on a per-item or per-package basis.390  With respect to 
the first issue, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the Board’s view that 
the contract was patently ambiguous, holding that “[t]he clear 
language of the contract supports LAI’s reading of the requirements 
of the contract with respect to CLIN 0001 and CLIN 0002.”391  
Construing the descriptions of each CLIN in the contract, the 
Federal Circuit held that “CLIN 0001 was a catchall provision” to be 
used “‘unless noted below’ in another CLIN number.”392  Because 
CLIN 0002 specifically listed statement of work Section C-5.5.1, which 
dealt with MMP of off-base transshipments, the Court held that that 
work was “noted below” and therefore excluded from CLIN 0001.393   
On appeal, the government argued in support of the Board’s 
conclusion that construing Section C-5.5.1 to include the work at 
issue created a conflict with another provision of the contract.394   
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that “the plain language of 
the contract compels the conclusion that billing and payment for 
MMP of off-base transshipments was governed by CLIN 0002.”395   
The court reasoned that the Government’s construction of the 
contract, and not LAI’s, impermissibly sought to add terms to the 
contract that were not there.396 
LAI’s victory on the first issue, however, was tempered by the 
Federal Circuit’s resolution of the second.  Although the court 
                                                 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. at 1309–10.     
 389. Id. at 1310.   
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 1316.   
 392. Id. at 1311. 
 393. Id. at 1314 (“As the plain language of Section C-5.5.1 covers MMP of off-base 
transshipments, they fall within CLIN 0002, not within CLIN 0001.”). 
 394. Id. at 1312 (discussing the Board’s rationale); id. at 1313 (discussing the 
Government’s argument).  
 395. Id. at 1315. 
 396. Id. 
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agreed that the work was covered by CLIN 0002, which provided a 
“fixed unit price per each,” the court ultimately held that “each” 
meant each container, rather than each item being packed.397  Having 
held that the payment was to be made under CLIN 0001, the Board 
had not reached this issue;398 the Federal Circuit nevertheless decided 
the question while noting that both parties had urged the court to do 
so and that the Board had taken extensive testimony and made 
specific factual findings related to the issue.399  The court therefore 
concluded that resolving the issue was “in the interest of judicial 
efficiency when remand is unlikely to produce additional facts or 
guidance.”400 
The Federal Circuit reasoned that, although “each” was not 
defined in the contract, “reading the contract as a whole supports a 
per-container billing structure.”401  The court held that “each” 
referred to the title of the CLIN, which, in the case of CLIN 0002,  
was “PPP&M,” or “Preservation, Packaging, Packing, and Marking.”402  
The court’s analysis on this point is not entirely clear from the 
opinion, but the court apparently accepted the Government’s 
argument that “‘each’ means each PPP&M activity,” which, in turn, 
meant each package.403  The court appears to have also been swayed 
by the Government’s argument that paying LAI per item would result 
in a windfall, particularly where a container contained many small 
items.404  Regardless, the court held that even if the contract were 
ambiguous on this point, LAI would still lose because it had not 
demonstrated that it relied on its interpretation when preparing its 
bid.405  Pointing to “numerous documents where LAI estimated the 
number of containers needed for transshipments in a one-to-one 
item-to-container ratio,” the Court found that “LAI consistently 
believed the number of containers would equal the number of 
transshipment items, and therefore could not have relied on an 
                                                 
 397. Id. at 1317. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. (citing Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)).   
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. at 1311.  
 403. Id. at 1316.   
 404. Id. at 1316, 1318.  
 405. Id. at 1317 (quoting P.R. Burke Co. v. United States, 277 F.3d 1346, 1356 n.3 
(Fed. Cir. 2002)) (“In order for a contractor to recover based on an ambiguous 
contract provision, the contractor must have relied on its interpretation when 
preparing its bid.”). 
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interpretation where it would make hundreds of thousands of dollars 
per container.”406   
3.  Bank of Guam v. United States407  
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Bank of Guam v. United States 
turned on the “plain meaning” of a single word—“imposed.”408   
The question in that appeal was whether the Territory of Guam could 
collect taxes imposed on earnings from U.S. Treasury bonds held by 
the Bank of Guam (the Bank).409  The Bank argued that the terms of 
the bonds exempted interest from taxation by Guam, including 
taxation under the Guam Territorial Income Tax (GTIT)—a tax 
enacted by the U.S. Congress but collected by Guam.410  In 2002, 
however, a U.S. district court held that the interest was taxable under 
the GTIT, and the Bank thereafter brought suit against the U.S. 
Government in the COFC to recover back-taxes it was forced to pay 
on interest received from the bonds.411 
The bonds each contained a statement “that they were exempt 
from all taxation now or hereafter imposed . . . by . . . any of the 
possessions of the United States.”412  The Federal Circuit, affirming 
the COFC’s dismissal of the breach of contract claim, held that there 
was no breach of contract because the GTIT was not “imposed” by 
Guam.413  The Court appeared to ground this conclusion in the plain 
meaning rule:  “[I]t is quite clear that Congress, not Guam, enacted, 
authorized, or otherwise imposed the GTIT.”414   
The court’s conclusion that the phrase “imposed by” clearly and 
unambiguously means “enacted by” or “authorized by,” but not 
“collected by,” is far from self-evident.  As the Bank argued on appeal 
and in its petition for rehearing, the term “imposed” has meanings 
other than “enacted by” or “authorized by.”415  For example, Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “impose” as meaning “[t]o levy or exact.”416  
                                                 
 406. Id. at 1318. 
 407. 578 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 408. See id. at 1327 (discussing the use of the word “imposed” in regulations, in 
express contracts, and by Congress). 
 409. Id. at 1320.   
 410. Id. at 1321, 1324.    
 411. Id. at 1322.   
 412. Id. at 1326–27.  Guam is a “possession” of the United States under the 
Organic Act of Guam.  See Organic Act of Guam, Pub. L. No. 630, 64 Stat. 384 
(codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1421 (2006)).  
 413. See Bank of Guam, 578 F.3d at 1328.   
 414. Id. at 1327.  
 415. See id.; Plaintiff-Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 13–14, Bank of 
Guam v. United States, No. 2008-5078 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2009) (reh’g denied  
Dec. 18, 2009). 
 416. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, the court’s opinion contains little analysis of the term 
imposed, instead relying on statements made by the Bank’s counsel 
during oral argument417 and two Ninth Circuit opinions finding that 
the GTIT was “imposed” by Congress.418  Having concluded that the 
language was plain and unambiguous based, in part, on evidence 
outside the four corners of the contract, the court refused to consider 
parole evidence offered by the Bank.419  
4.     Stockton East Water District v. United States420 
The Federal Circuit also disposed of Stockton East Water District v. 
United States based on its reading of the plain meaning of the contract 
at issue in that appeal.421  The contract required the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation to release a minimum amount of water to the Stockton 
East Water District.422  When the Bureau failed to release the requisite 
amount, the Water District sued under a breach of contract theory.423  
The Government defended on the ground that the failure to release 
the water was “beyond the control” of the Bureau within the meaning 
of a contract clause that provided “if a shortage does occur during 
any year because of drought, or other causes which . . . are beyond 
the control of the United States, no liability shall accure [sic] against 
the United States.”424  The Government asserted that the failure to 
release the water was “beyond the control” of the Bureau because it 
was the result of a congressionally directed change in water 
management policy.425 
The Federal Circuit found the Government’s argument 
unpersuasive.426  The Court found that the plain meaning of the 
phrase “beyond the control of the United States on its face 
exclude[d] anything that [was] within the control of the United 
States.”427  Under the contract provision at issue, drought, 
earthquakes, or even sabotage would have excused the 
                                                 
 417. Bank of Guam, 578 F.3d at 1327. 
 418. Id. at 1328 (citing Gumataotao v. Dir. of Dep’t of Revenue and Taxation,  
236 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2001); Bank of Am., Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. Chaco, 539 
F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
 419. See id. (quoting McAbee Constr., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1435 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[I]f the ‘provisions are clear and unambiguous, they must be given 
their plain and ordinary meaning,’ and the court may not resort to extrinsic evidence 
to interpret them.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 420. 583 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 421. Id. at 1361–62. 
 422. Id. at 1350–51.   
 423. See id. at 1354.   
 424. Id. at 1360–61.   
 425. See id. at 1356, 1361. 
 426. See id. at 1361–62. 
 427. See id. at 1361.   
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Government.428  In contrast, “changes in law, or changes in 
government policy, or changes in management practices brought 
about by the Government’s changes in law or policy, are all causes 
within the control of the United States.”429  Thus, on this basis, the 
Federal Circuit rejected the Government’s defense to the breach of 
contract claim. 
5.     Arko Executive Services, Inc. v. United States430 
Arko Executive Services, Inc. v. United States appears to be the only 
appeal involving a question of contract interpretation where the 
Federal Circuit did not believe the language at issue had a “plain 
meaning.”  The court reconciled two FAR clauses that provide the 
Government with the right to extend performance under a contract:  
FAR § 52.217-9, “Option to Extend the Term of the Contract,” and 
FAR 52.217-8, “Option to Extend Services.”431  The court held that the 
former clause, which provides that “the total duration of this 
contract, including the exercise of any options under this clause, shall 
not exceed five years,” did not preclude the Government from 
extending performance beyond five years under the latter clause.432   
The contract at issue in Arko provided for a base year and four  
one-year options, each of which the Government exercised.433  Prior 
to expiration of the fourth option year on March 31, 2005,  
the Government solicited proposals for a follow-on contract to begin 
April 1, 2005.434  The follow-on procurement was apparently delayed, 
and in March 2005, the Government notified Arko that it would 
require services through April 30, 2005, pursuant to FAR § 52.217-8, 
which was included in the contract and provides: 
The Government may require continued performance of any 
services within the limits and at the rates specified in the contract. . . .  
The option provision may be exercised more than once, but the 
total extension of performance hereunder shall not exceed 6 
months.435  
Arko objected, arguing that FAR § 52.217-9 placed an absolute, 
five-year limit on the duration of options.436  That clause provides: 
                                                 
 428. Id. at 1361–62. 
 429. Id. at 1362. 
 430. 553 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 431. Id. at 1377–78. 
 432. Id. at 1379–80 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.217-9(c) (2009)). 
 433. Id. at 1376–77.   
 434. Id. at 1377.   
 435. Id. at 1378 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.217-8). 
 436. Id. at 1379. 
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(a) The Government may extend the term of this contract by 
written notice to the Contractor within the performance period of 
the contract or within 30 days after funds for the option year 
become available, whichever is later. 
(b) If the Government exercises this option, the extended contract 
shall be considered to include this option provision. 
(c) The total duration of this contract, including the exercise of 
any options under this clause, shall not exceed five years.437 
Arko argued that the only contractual provision allowing 
continued services was FAR § 52.237-3, “Continuity of Services.”438  
That clause requires the contractor to provide “phase-in, phase-out 
services for up to 90 days after this contract expires.”439  Unlike FAR  
§ 52.217-8, where the contractor is compensated at “the rates 
specified in the contract,” FAR § 52.237-3(d) provides that “[t]he 
contractor shall be reimbursed for all reasonable phase-in, phase-out 
costs and a fee (profit).”440  Arko asserted that its continued 
performance caused it to incur $184,010.10 in costs above the 
compensation provided under FAR § 52.217-8.441   
In reconciling these “labyrinthine” contract clauses, the court ruled 
that the five-year limit in FAR § 52.217-9 did not prevent the 
Government from extending the contract under FAR § 52.217-8.442  
The court relied first on the phrase “including the exercise of any 
options under this clause” in FAR § 52.217-9(c), and held that  
“the five-year limit includes the options discussed in the FAR  
§ 52.217-9 clause . . . but does not include options to extend services, 
such as FAR § 52.217-8, that are not under the clause.”443  The court 
reasoned further that the purpose of FAR § 52.217-8 is to “allow[] the 
government to extend services without negotiating short extensions 
to existing contracts in circumstances, such as those here, where the 
award of a successor contract is delayed.”444  According to the court, 
allowing the six months extension permitted by FAR 52.217-8 in 
addition to the five years permitted under FAR § 52.217-9 is 
consistent with that purpose.445 
                                                 
 437. Id. at 1378 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.217-9(a)–(c)).   
 438. Id. at 1377.   
 439. Id. at 1379 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.237-3(b)). 
 440. Id. (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.237-3(d)). 
 441. Id. at 1377. 
 442. Id. at 1378, 1380–81.  
 443. Id. at 1379–80. 
 444. Id. at 1380.  
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The Court regarded the facts of Arko as “exactly the situation FAR 
§ 217-8 was written to address”—i.e., one in which the award of a 
follow-on contract has been delayed notwithstanding the 
Government’s reasonable efforts to have the follow-on contract in 
place at the expiration of the predecessor contract.446  A tougher 
situation is presented by appeals such as In re Griffin Services, Inc.,447 
where the Government arguably used FAR § 52.217-8 to extend a 
contract because it failed to properly exercise the contract’s options 
in accordance with section 52.217-9.448  On one hand, the court in 
Arko relied first and foremost on the language of FAR § 52.217-9, 
which the court suggested did not limit the Government’s rights 
under FAR § 52.217-8 by its terms.449  On the other hand, the court’s 
emphasis on the special purpose of FAR § 52.217-8 suggests that the 
court may not tolerate the Government’s use of that clause to 
accomplish another purpose altogether. 
6.     States Roofing Corp. v. Winter450 
In States Roofing Corp. v. Winter, the Federal Circuit found that a 
contractor’s interpretation of a contract was within the “zone of 
reasonableness” and reversed the Armed Services Board of Contract 
Appeal’s (the Board) ruling to the contrary.451  At issue was whether 
States Roofing reasonably interpreted waterproofing requirements of 
a roofing contract such that the Government’s conflicting 
interpretation was a constructive change to the contract that merited 
additional compensation.452   
                                                 
the basic and option periods shall not exceed 5 years in the case of services.”  Id.  
According to the Court: 
[T]he contract still specifies limits on the ‘duration of the contract including 
any extension,’ as required by FAR 17.204(e); the maximum duration 
including extensions is the five years comprising the initial performance 
period and four renewal options, plus up to six months of extended services 
under FAR 52.217-8 and up to 90 days of phase-in, phase-out services under 
FAR 52.237-3.  
Id.  The Court also rejected Arko’s assertion that it should be compensated under 
FAR 52.237-3, holding that Arko did not provide “phase-in, phase-out services” as 
contemplated in that clause.  Id. at 1381.  The Court reasoned that that clause 
“contemplates phase-in, phase-out services of a kind different from the usual services 
performed under the contract” and that, by contrast, “Arko performed the same type 
of services [after expiration of the fourth one-year option] as it did during the 
previous period.”  Id.  
 446. Id. at 1380. 
 447. ASBCA No. 52280, 52281, 02-2 BCA ¶ 31943 (2002).  
 448. Id.; see also Vernon J. Edwards, Postscript:  When the Government Can Choose 
Among Options, 21 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 57 (2007).  
 449. Arko, 553 F.3d at 1379–80. 
 450. 587 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   
 451. Id. at 1372.  
 452. Id. at 1366.   
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Prior to bidding on the contract, States Roofing inspected the roof 
and observed that a prior contractor had applied waterproofing paint 
on the roof.453  Based on this information and its interpretation of the 
contract, States Roofing accounted only for the costs of 
waterproofing paint when preparing its bid.454  The Government 
objected to States Roofing’s approach after performance began, 
however, and insisted that the contract required the installation of 
flashing, which was more costly than paint.455  States Roofing 
complied with the Government’s demands and then requested an 
equitable adjustment for the additional costs.456   
On appeal from the CO’s denial of States Roofing’s claim, the 
Board held that the contract contained a patent ambiguity for which 
States Roofing was obligated to inquire.457  The Board also reasoned 
that details in drawings included with the solicitation should have put 
States Roofing on notice that something more than waterproofing 
paint was required.458  The Board came to this conclusion 
notwithstanding the revelation that the Government “inadvertently” 
omitted key specifications from the contract that could have 
prevented the misunderstanding.459  Thus, while the Board 
recognized States Roofing’s pre-bid efforts to ascertain the 
appropriate method of waterproofing, it concluded that the patent 
ambiguity contained in the contract meant that States Roofing had a 
duty to inquire before proceeding with the contract.460   
The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision, finding that the 
contract’s ambiguity on this issue was latent, not patent, and “that 
States Roofing’s interpretation was within the zone of 
reasonableness.”461  The Court found that the totality of the evidence 
and circumstances—particularly the use of waterproofing paint on 
the roof by prior contractors—meant that States Roofing’s 
interpretation was reasonable.462  Conflicting expert testimony 
weighed in favor of States Roofing’s interpretation,463 and the fact 
that the Government omitted key specifications that could have 
                                                 
 453. Id. at 1367. 
 454. Id. at 1369.   
 455. Id. at 1367.    
 456. Id.   
 457. Id. at 1368.   
 458. Id.   
 459. Id. (finding another document provided to the contractor sufficiently 
indicated the need for the flashing material).   
 460. Id. at 1367–68, 1372.   
 461. Id. at 1372.   
 462. Id.   
 463. Id.   
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avoided the misunderstanding weighed heavily on the Court’s 
decision as well.464  Applying the rule of contra proferentem,465 the 
Federal Circuit construed the ambiguity against the contract’s drafter 
and held in favor of States Roofing.466   
C. Cost Accounting Issues 
In both of its 2009 decisions addressing contract cost principles, 
the Federal Circuit declared that it was bound by prior decisions, to 
the detriment of the contractors involved.  The court strictly 
interpreted the cost regulations involved in each of the cases.  
Accordingly, government contractors need to be familiar with these 
Federal Circuit decisions and factor them into their business 
decisions regarding whether and when to settle disagreements with 
third parties and the Government.  Failure to do so could lead to 
significant unallowed contract costs or severe interest penalties. 
1.     Geren v. Tecom, Inc. 
The Federal Circuit reversed a summary judgment decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA or “the Board”) 
in favor of Tecom, Inc.467  The ASBCA held that Tecom’s defense 
costs and settlement payments associated with a Title VII sexual 
harassment suit were allowable costs under the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR).468  Tecom sought to include $96,163.16 in legal 
fees in its indirect cost pool for general and administrative expenses 
(G&A) and to bill the $50,000 settlement payment, for which Tecom 
admitted no wrongdoing, as direct costs to the contract on which the 
alleged sexual harassment had occurred.469  The Federal Circuit held 
that, had the lawsuit proceeded to trial, costs associated with an 
adverse judgment would not be allowable under the contract, and 
that “defense and settlement costs are allowable only if the contractor 
can show that the plaintiff in the Title VII suit had very little 
likelihood of success” on the merits.470  
The ASBCA held that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Boeing North 
American, Inc. v. Roche,471 which established the standard of “very little 
likelihood of success on the merits” for reimbursement of legal and 
                                                 
 464. Id.  
 465. Id. 
 466. Id.   
 467. Geren v. Tecom, Inc., 566 F.3d 1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 468. Id. (citing Tecom, Inc., ASBCA No. 53884, 54461, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33674 (2007)). 
 469. Id. 
 470. Id. 
 471. 298 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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settlement costs,472 was limited to circumstances where the underlying 
lawsuit alleged that the contractor had engaged in criminal conduct, 
fraud, or violations of the Major Fraud Act of 1988.473  The Federal 
Circuit disagreed, declaring that Boeing was not limited to its facts, but 
instead applied to “all private settlements where defense and 
judgment costs would be disallowed if the case went to final judgment 
against the contractor.”474 
The Federal Circuit applied a two-step analysis to determine if 
defense and settlement costs are allowable under FAR subpart 31.2.475  
The first step is to determine whether damages, costs or attorney’s 
fees would be allowable if the lawsuit proceeded to trial and an 
adverse judgment was issued.476  In this case, the court held that 
litigation costs associated with a Title VII lawsuit would not have been 
allowable under the FAR because the contract contained the clause at 
FAR § 52.222-26, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.477  
Thus, sexual harassment would breach the contract terms.478  The 
Federal Circuit held that costs resulting from a contract breach are 
unallowable under the precedent of the claims court.479  
Having determined that the costs would not be reimbursable if the 
Title VII plaintiff had obtained an adverse judgment against Tecom, 
the Federal Circuit proceeded to the next step in its inquiry—
determining whether the costs of settlement are allowable.  Here, the 
Federal Circuit held that its decision in Boeing controlled, even 
though Boeing addressed only defense costs rather than settlement 
payments.480  Applying Boeing, the Federal Circuit concluded that if 
damages or penalties resulting from an adverse judgment would be 
disallowed under the contract, settlement costs also are unallowable 
“unless the contractor can establish that the private Title VII plaintiff 
had very little likelihood of success on the merits.”481 
                                                 
 472. Id. at 1288–89. 
 473. Geren, 566 F.3d at 1040. 
 474. Id. at 1046. 
 475. Id. at 1041. 
 476. Id. 
 477. Id. at 1043. 
 478. Id. at 1044. 
 479. Id. at 1043 (citing Dade Bros., Inc. v. United States, 325 F.2d 239, 240 (Ct. Cl. 
1963)). 
 480. Id. at 1046. 
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2.     Gates v. Raytheon Co.482 
The Federal Circuit reversed a decision of the ASBCA and held 
that failure to make an adjustment during the current accounting 
period stemming from the sale, discontinued operations, or other 
closure of a business segment violates Cost Accounting Standard 
(CAS) 413-50483 and results in increased payments by the 
Government.484  Most importantly, the court found that Raytheon 
owed interest compounded daily on the amount it was required to 
repay the Government.485 
The case stems from Raytheon’s sale of two business units,  
in December 1998 and July 2000, which had performed CAS-covered 
government contracts.486  After each sale, Raytheon and the 
Government eventually agreed on the amount of the Government’s 
share of surplus pension costs for the closed business segments under 
CAS 413-50(c)(12).487  On September 21, 2004, Raytheon paid the 
agreed upon amounts ($487,305 and $14,681,268), but refused to pay 
the simple interest the Government had requested on those 
amounts.488  The CO later issued a final decision that Raytheon had 
not complied with the CAS 413 requirements to make pension 
surplus adjustments in the current accounting period and therefore 
owed interest to the Government.489  
The ASBCA initially granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Government, holding that Raytheon’s failure to promptly provide an 
adjustment for the Government’s share of the surplus pension costs 
resulted in noncompliance with CAS 413.490  Because the Board found 
that Raytheon’s noncompliance led to increased Government costs, 
Raytheon was held liable for interest under the “CAS clause” in its 
Government contracts, FAR § 52.230-2.491  The Board also held that 
this interest should be calculated using daily compounding under  
26 U.S.C. §§ 6621-22.492  On reconsideration, the ASBCA reversed its 
earlier decision and held that the record was unclear on the 
accounting treatment of the surplus adjustments.493  The ASBCA 
                                                 
 482. 584 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 483. 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-50 (2009).   
 484. Raytheon, 584 F.3d at 1063–65. 
 485. Id. at 1071–72. 
 486. Id. at 1065. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. 
 489. Id. at 1065–66. 
 490. See Raytheon Co., ASBCA No. 54907, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33655, at 14 (2007). 
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 493. Raytheon Co., ASBCA No. 54907, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33859, at 1–2 (2008).   
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determined that the Government had failed to show any increased 
costs had resulted from a CAS violation.494  The Board therefore 
concluded that the CAS clause did not apply, and no interest was due 
from Raytheon.495 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[o]n the 
undisputed facts, it is clear that Raytheon violated CAS 413” by not 
paying the pension adjustments in the same accounting periods in 
which the sales of the business segments occurred.496  The court also 
found that this noncompliance increased the Government’s costs on 
the Raytheon contracts that were open during those accounting 
periods, in other words, the Government’s payments on those open 
contracts would have been lower if Raytheon had complied with CAS 
413 by crediting those contracts at the appropriate time.497  Having 
determined that Raytheon violated CAS 413 and that the violation 
resulted in increased costs to the Government, the Federal Circuit 
then turned to 41 U.S.C. § 422(h) to determine how interest on the 
Government’s overpayments should be calculated.498 
As the Federal Circuit explained, § 442(h) applies the annual 
interest rate designated by section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code 
to CAS violations: 
The interest rate applicable to any contract price adjustment shall 
be the annual rate of interest established under section 6621 of 
title 26 for such period.  Such interest shall accrue from the time 
payments of the increased costs were made to the contractor or 
subcontractor to the time the United States receives full 
compensation for the price adjustment.499 
Section 6622 of the Internal Revenue Code then requires daily 
compounding of “any interest required to be paid under this title or 
sections 1961(c)(1) or 2411 of title 28, United States Code.”500   
In Raytheon, the Federal Circuit stated that it was bound by its 
decision in Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States501 that statutes 
like 41 U.S.C. § 442, “which require interest payments at the rate set 
                                                 
 494. Id. at 2.   
 495. Id. at 3.  
 496. Raytheon, 584 F.3d at 1067. 
 497. Id. at 1068–69.  In contrast, the ASBCA analyzed the issue of increased costs 
by examining whether the Government had overpaid during previous accounting 
periods.  Id. at 1068.   
 498. Id. at 1069. 
 499. Id. at 1069–70 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 442(h)(4) (2006)).   
 500. Id at 1070 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6622(a) (2006)).   
 501. 884 F.2d 563 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  
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out in § 6621[,] require compound interest.”502  The Federal Circuit 
explicitly stated that it could not contradict Canadian Fur Trappers, 
even if Raytheon’s arguments appealed to the court and “may 
support” a different interpretation of the statutes.503 
These statements seem to hint at the possibility of a future en banc 
decision to overturn Canadian Fur Trappers.  Unless and until such a 
decision is issued, however, contractors will have to pay compound 
interest for any CAS violation that results in increased Government 
costs—likely resulting in enormous penalties for contractors.   
D. Termination for Default 
1.     McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States504 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United 
States brought a final conclusion to eighteen years of litigation 
(including three rounds of appeals) resulting from the U.S. Navy’s 
1991 termination for default of the contract held by McDonnell 
Douglas and General Dynamics for development of the A-12 Avenger 
stealth aircraft.505  The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s judgment 
that the termination for default was justified based on the 
contractors’ failure to make progress.506  The Federal Circuit’s last 
opinion in this case addresses the issue of when a contract can be 
terminated for default for failure to make progress in the absence of 
a definitive contract completion date.507  But perhaps the most 
important lesson to be learned from the saga of this dispute is that 
fixed-price research and development contracts are fraught with risk 
for both the contractor and the Government and should be entered 
into only after careful review of the business case and contract 
terms.508 
The Navy awarded the $4.7 billion, fixed-price research and 
development contract in 1988.509  The contract required delivery of 
eight prototype aircraft between June 1990 and January 1991 and 
provided the Navy the option to purchase four production lots of 
                                                 
 502. 584 F.3d at 1070 (citing Canadian Fur Trappers, 884 F.2d at 568 (applying 
compound interest to international trade and tariff duties)).   
 503. Id. at 1071, n.10. 
 504. 567 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (McDonnell Douglas XIV). 
 505. Id. at 1342. 
 506. Id. at 1355–56. 
 507. Id. at 1351–53. 
 508. See id. at 1355–56 (noting that both parties realized the contract was a 
mistake). 
 509. Id. at 1342. 
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aircraft.510  The Navy exercised its option in May 1990 for six 
production aircraft that were to be delivered between June 1991 and 
May 1992.511  The contractors encountered significant performance 
problems from the beginning, which led them to miss the first flight 
date in June 1990 and to propose a modification to the contract’s 
fixed-price structure.512  The contractors anticipated that the costs 
necessary to complete the contract would be “unacceptable.”513   
When the contractors missed the first flight date, the CO sent a letter 
“expressing ‘serious concern’ regarding the deficient performance” 
and requesting the contractors’ plan to meet the original contract 
schedule, as well as a proposed contract revision.514  The Navy issued a 
unilateral modification in August 1990 to revise the prototype 
delivery dates; the modification did not revise the delivery dates for 
the production aircraft.515  The contractors continued to experience 
delays and to rack up additional costs, leading them in November 
1990 to request that the Navy restructure the contract to a  
cost-reimbursement type contract.516   
In December 1990, “then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 
directed the Secretary of the Navy to show cause by January 4, 1991, 
why the A-12 program should not be terminated.”517  The Navy issued 
a cure notice on December 17, 1990, which stated that the 
contractors’ performance was “unsatisfactory” and that they had 
failed to meet specification requirements or fabricate parts to meet 
the delivery schedule.518  During meetings between Government 
personnel and the contractors, the contractors admitted that they 
could not meet the revised schedules or some of the specifications, 
and the Navy terminated the contract for default on January 7, 
1991.519  The contractors claimed that they were not in default 
because the specifications and delivery schedules were 
unachievable.520  
The contractors appealed both the termination and the 
Government’s subsequent demand for $1.35 billion in unliquidated 
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progress payments at the COFC.521  In the second appeal to the 
Federal Circuit, the appellate court instructed the COFC to 
determine the contract completion date under Lisbon Contractors, Inc. 
v. United States.522  The Federal Circuit explained that under Lisbon 
Contractors, the Government was not required to establish “absolute 
impossibility of performance” to justify default.523  Instead, the 
Government must show that the CO had a reasonable belief that 
there was “no reasonable likelihood that the contractor could 
perform the entire contract effort within the time remaining for 
contract performance.”524  Applying Lisbon Contractors while using the 
delivery dates in the Navy’s unilateral modification as a yardstick for 
reasonable performance, the COFC concluded that the Government 
was justified in terminating the contract for failure to make 
progress.525 
In the third and final appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the 
COFC that the contract as modified did not provide a definite 
contract completion date.526  However, the court refused to adopt the 
contractors’ argument that, under Lisbon Contractors, the absence of a 
definite contract completion date absolutely precluded the 
Government from justifiably terminating the contract for failure to 
make progress.527  The Federal Circuit instead looked to the Court of 
Claims’ decision in Universal Fiberglass Corp. v. United States,528 cited in 
Lisbon Contractors, as well as previous McDonnell Douglas decisions.529  
In Universal Fiberglass, the Court of Claims held that the cure notice 
served to inform the contractor when the time for default had been 
reached in a case where the contract itself did not include a delivery 
schedule.530  The Federal Circuit found that the facts related to the  
A-12 termination were sufficiently similar to those in Universal 
Fiberglass to rely on the latter decision as precedent.531  Considering 
the totality of the circumstances, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
the CO was reasonably justified in his belief that the contractors 
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could not timely complete the contract and therefore affirmed the 
COFC’s judgment.532  The Federal Circuit also reiterated that Lisbon 
Contractors remains good law and that the conclusions in McDonnell 
Douglas XIV were “dictated by the unique facts of this case.”533 
IV. WINSTAR AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL CASES 
After more than a dozen years of Winstar litigation, the Federal 
Circuit has reached the point at which its decisions no longer blaze 
paths announcing new precedent that dramatically affects the 
outcomes of other cases.  Instead, the court’s recent role has been 
primarily limited to policing the COFC’s various decisions on issues 
of the Government’s liability for breach and, more commonly, the 
quantum of damages.  Following years in which there were virtually 
no decisions affirming damage awards against the Government, the 
balance has recently shifted and decisions from the COFC have slowly 
but steadily presented the Federal Circuit with questions regarding 
the effects of the Government’s breach and the nature of recoverable 
damages.  As the focus of many of the decisions shifts to damages, 
they are more likely to center on traditional contractual concepts of 
but-for or proximate causation and foreseeability, and to delve into 
the nuances of highly fact-specific damage models that the plaintiff’s 
and Government’s experts have prepared.   
Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) cases have emerged as the new Winstar 
cases, in the sense that there is a critical mass of factually similar cases 
that are likely to focus primarily on individual plaintiffs’ entitlement 
to, and the quantum of, damages.  The Federal Circuit’s sole 
published SNF decision in 2009 was consistent with its earlier 
decisions in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. United States534 and Yankee 
Atomic Electric Co. v. United States,535 in which the Federal Circuit 
determined the proper method for calculating damages in a SNF case 
is to include the “most reasonable measure of the contractual 
acceptance rate” and that, while a trial court may apply the 
substantial factor test to establish causation in SNF cases, a plausible 
but-for world must still be established in any damages modeling to 
calculate expectancy damages.536 
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A. Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. United  States537 
In Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. United States, a Winstar 
case, the Government arranged for Fidelity New York, F.S.B., a Long 
Island savings and loan association (“thrift”), to absorb Suburbia 
Federal Savings & Loan, another Long Island thrift about to fail.538   
In addition to a cash incentive to take on the failing thrift, the 
Government agreed to allow Fidelity to favorably account for 
“supervisory goodwill” generated by the transaction to meet Fidelity’s 
regulatory capital maintenance requirements, and to amortize that 
goodwill over a thirty-year period.539  Five years later, Congress passed 
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act 
(FIRREA),540 which prohibited the favorable treatment of supervisory 
goodwill, resulting in the breach at issue in the Winstar cases, and 
which was the undisputed breach in this case.541 
Following the enactment of FIRREA, Astoria Federal Savings & 
Loan Association merged with Fidelity and filed suit in the COFC.542  
The Government conceded that the statutory disallowance of the 
supervisory goodwill resulted in a breach of its agreement with 
Fidelity, and the COFC conducted a trial solely to determine 
damages.543  The COFC issued a judgment awarding Astoria 
$16,042,877.544  “[T]he parties [did] not contest[] the court’s rulings 
with respect to the bulk of the damages requested at trial, [however,] 
the government [did seek] reversal with respect to several issues that 
affect the size of the damages award.”545 
The Federal Circuit began its opinion with a review of the facts 
specific to Fidelity’s situation, which affected the causal link between 
the breach and certain damages.  The court first noted that during 
the early 1980s, Fidelity’s portfolio had been heavily invested in 
commercial loans to developers of condominium and cooperative 
conversion projects in the New York City area.546  Because Fidelity was 
so heavily weighted in this area, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
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(“the Bank Board”) had warned that “Fidelity’s asset management 
strategy was giving rise to considerable credit risk exposure.”547   
At the same time, Suburbia was struggling and on the verge of 
collapse due to its liabilities exceeding its assets.548  In order to avoid a 
substantial deposit insurance liability that the Government would be 
responsible for if Suburbia collapsed, the Government sought out 
suitors to acquire the bank.549 
Fidelity agreed to acquire Suburbia in exchange for various 
inducements from the Government.550  Included in these 
inducements was Fidelity’s ability to treat Suburbia’s net liabilities as 
“supervisory goodwill” and account for the goodwill as regulatory 
capital that would be amortized over a thirty-year period.551  Following 
its acquisition of Suburbia, Fidelity continued to expand its 
commercial real estate and construction loan portfolios to the point 
where the Government grew concerned that Fidelity’s management 
lacked the ability to run the company.552  Two years after the 
acquisition, Fidelity brought in a new, experienced management 
team that immediately began to diversify Fidelity’s portfolio.553 
Despite Fidelity’s best efforts, when the New York real estate 
market experienced a sudden downturn, it severely damaged 
Fidelity’s balance sheet.554  Based on these changes in market 
conditions, Fidelity’s MACRO scores—the rating system used by 
regulators to assess a thrift’s financial health, with 1 being the best 
score and 5 being the worst—dropped across the board.555   
Following the passage of FIRREA, the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS) expanded its role in supervising thrifts and instituted 
regulations severely limiting thrifts with low MACRO scores—like 
Fidelity’s—from adding assets.556  Regulatory Bulletin 3a-1 (“RB 3a-1”) 
mandated that “any thrift that had been deemed ‘insolvent’ or had 
received an overall MACRO score of 4 or 5 would be restricted to 
little or no growth in assets.”557  Post-FIRREA, Fidelity could no longer 
account for supervisory goodwill as regulatory capital or amortize that 
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goodwill over the thirty-year period.558  Accordingly, OTS projected 
Fidelity would fail to satisfy regulatory capital requirements at the 
time FIRREA became effective and thus required Fidelity to prepare a 
capital restoration plan that would bring Fidelity back into capital 
compliance.559  As part of this plan, Fidelity agreed to reduce its 
projected asset growth to almost zero.560 
For nearly three years, Fidelity functioned under strict OTS 
oversight.561  “In May 1993, Fidelity converted from mutual to stock 
ownership [and] used the proceeds from the public offering to 
complete [its] capital restoration plan.”562  After successfully 
completing its plan, OTS lifted its restrictions and Fidelity was free to 
attempt to grow its assets at a normal rate.563  However, after 
operating subject to the OTS’s severe restrictions that had applied to 
thrifts with poor MACRO ratings for so many years, Fidelity was no 
longer competitive in the market.564   
Based on its market position, Fidelity elected to merge with Astoria 
in January 1995.565  “Goodwill” from the Suburbia transaction did not 
survive the merger.566  Fidelity/Astoria567 then sued in the COFC 
“alleging that the enactment of FIRREA resulted in a breach of the 
government’s agreement to count Suburbia’s goodwill toward 
Fidelity’s regulatory capital requirements and to permit the 
amortization of that goodwill over a 30-year period.”568  The 
Government did not dispute liability but did dispute damages, and 
the COFC found that Fidelity was entitled to $16,042,887 in lost 
profits and “wounded bank” damages attributed to Fidelity’s higher 
operating costs based on the breach.569  The damages award included 
purported damages extending through January 1995 to account for 
the residual effects of the breach.570 
The Government subsequently appealed to the Federal Circuit, 
raising multiple challenges to the award of damages.  First, the 
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Government contended that, due to Fidelity’s financial state prior to 
the breach, even absent FIRREA, OTS would have had the power 
under RB 3a-1 to limit Fidelity’s growth during the period in question 
and, therefore, the damages Fidelity incurred could not be attributed 
to the breach.571  The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the Government 
and rejecting both the COFC’s finding and the arguments raised by 
Fidelity, found that in the hypothetical non-breach world, Fidelity 
would have nonetheless been subject to stricter OTS oversight and 
that Fidelity’s growth would have been restricted even in the absence 
of any breach.572  Accordingly, the court found that “the evidence 
indicates that as of January 1990 and for at least some period 
thereafter, Fidelity would have been unable to grow in accordance 
with its growth plan due to government restrictions imposed under 
[OTS’s authority].”573  Thus, the court remanded the case to the 
COFC with instructions to revise the damages award based on the 
effect the OTS regulations would have had in a non-breach world.574 
The court next affirmed the COFC’s other findings related to 
causation and determined that “absent FIRREA, Fidelity would have 
improved its overall MACRO score to 3 or better prior to July 1992,” 
and therefore, Fidelity would have been able to escape the 
restrictions placed upon it at that time.575  The court also affirmed the 
COFC’s finding that Fidelity could have improved its MACRO rating 
before July 1992 if FIRREA was not passed and could have continued 
with its expansion plans but for the breach.576 
The Government also argued that the COFC should have denied 
Fidelity “wounded bank” damages for the five months preceding 
Fidelity’s stock conversion.577  The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
COFC’s finding that Fidelity was entitled to “wounded bank” damages 
for at least the latter half of 1992 because Fidelity’s overall MACRO 
rating would have been a 3, not a 4, resulting in lower operating costs 
during that period, but-for the breach.578  However, the exact period 
for calculating these damages was unclear, and the Federal Circuit 
remanded with instructions that the COFC “should make a finding as 
to when, in the hypothetical non-breach world, OTS would have been 
satisfied that the limitations of [its regulations] were unnecessary” to 
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determine appropriate damages.579  Based upon this date, “the court 
should fashion an appropriate award based on the evidence of lost 
profits and ‘wounded bank’ damages.”580 
The court also addressed whether the damages award should be 
reduced or offset by certain additional costs Fidelity would have 
realized in the hypothetical non-breach world.581  First, “[t]he 
[G]overnment [sought] a $3.6 million reduction in the award based 
on the . . . expenses Fidelity would have incurred had it expanded its 
retail lending operations as it had planned to do in the late 1980s.”582  
The court rejected the Government’s argument and affirmed the 
COFC’s finding that Fidelity’s expert’s damages analysis was 
reasonable; in particular, agreeing with his decision not to include 
certain expenses, such as the salary and advertising expenses Fidelity 
would have incurred, based on the theory that any additional costs 
would have been offset by the additional profit generated.583  
However, the court agreed with the Government’s argument that the 
COFC should have reduced the damages based on the increased OTS 
fees that Fidelity would have incurred had it been able to achieve its 
projected growth from 1990 to 1993.584  Finally, with respect to how 
any “non-contractual goodwill” would have affected the lost profits 
damages model, the court affirmed the COFC’s finding that “Fidelity 
would have sustained a growth rate of eight percent even if it had 
been carrying only $37 million in excess regulatory capital.”585 
B. 1st Home Liquidating Trust v. United States586  
In 1st Home Liquidating Trust v. United States, 1st Home was a mutual 
thrift owned by its depositors.587  Years before Congress passed 
FIRREA, 1st Home sought to convert from a mutual thrift to a stock-
ownership thrift to avoid insolvency through a voluntary supervisory 
conversion in which one or more investors—not another thrift—
would provide the capital necessary to save the ailing thrift.588 
1st Home required the Bank Board approval to complete the 
voluntary conversion.589  In its “Application for Voluntary Supervisory 
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Conversion,” 1st Home sought a regulatory forbearance from the 
Bank Board and included in its business plan the proposed use of 
purchase-method accounting that would allow it to create a large 
amount of goodwill through the conversion.590  The Bank Board 
granted the forbearance request, but for three years, rather than the 
five years requested by 1st Home.591  The Bank Board’s response did 
not include any mention of 1st Home’s plan regarding its attempts to 
generate goodwill, but internal memoranda indicated that it believed 
the conversion would generate the goodwill 1st Home claimed it 
would.592 
1st Home completed the conversion in October 1986.593  FIRREA 
was subsequently passed, which prohibited 1st Home from 
continuing to count regulatory goodwill towards its capital 
requirements, as contemplated in its approved conversion plans.594  
This change led to 1st Home’s demise and eventual voluntary 
liquidation.595  Post-liquidation assets were transferred to a trust 
which, along with the 1st Home investors, sued the Government for 
breach of contract; they argued that the Government had a 
contractual obligation to permit 1st Home to continue to amortize 
goodwill over the approved period and that its inability to do so, 
following the passage of FIRREA, breached that obligation.596   
The COFC granted summary judgment in favor of 1st Home and 
awarded damages in the amount of $26 million.597  The COFC found 
that the application for a voluntary conversion—along with the 
business plan submitted to the Bank Board—constituted an offer, 
that the Government counter-offered with a shorter forbearance 
period but accepted all other terms, and that 1st Home’s conduct 
constituted acceptance of the offer.598  As part of this “contract,”  
1st Home had the right to utilize “purchase-method accounting” 
which would have resulted in approximately $40 million of regulatory 
goodwill amortized over a thirty-year period.599 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC, finding that no 
contract existed between the Bank Board and 1st Home (or its 
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investors) regarding regulatory goodwill.600  Noting that “[t]he party 
asserting the existence of a contract ‘must show (1) mutuality of 
intent to contract; (2) consideration; and (3) lack of ambiguity in 
offer and acceptance,’” the court found that there was “nothing more 
than a granular cloud of evidence indicating that 1st Home and the 
Government contracted regarding goodwill.”601 
The court, comparing this case to its recent decision in Suess v. 
United States,602 reiterated that the approval of amortization of 
goodwill, alone, does not constitute a guarantee or agreement that a 
thrift will be permitted to amortize goodwill as per the approval.603  
Thus, because all the Government had done in this case was 
acknowledge and approve of 1st Home’s proposed accounting 
method and treatment of goodwill, there was no evidence that the 
Government had the requisite intent to enter into a contract 
regarding 1st Home’s treatment of the goodwill and, accordingly,  
no contract was formed.604  The fact that the Bank Board had 
benefited from and encouraged 1st Home’s conversion had no effect 
on the court’s analysis, as neither constituted negotiations between 
the Government and the thrift.605  Likewise, neither the fact that the 
investors believed the Government had promised favorable 
accounting treatment nor the fact that the voluntary conversion 
made financial sense only if the goodwill could be amortized over an 
extended period of time, were evidence of any mutual intent to 
contract regarding the treatment of goodwill.606  Furthermore, the 
court’s analysis was not affected by the fact that the Bank Board had 
“conditioned its approval of the conversion on receiving an 
accountant’s letter detailing the proposed amortization of 
goodwill.”607 
Finally, the court noted that, unlike in other cases where a contract 
had been recognized regarding the treatment of regulatory goodwill, 
here the Government had not “clearly incentivized the relevant 
transactions by providing cash assistance or by making express 
promises regarding the accounting treatment of supervisory 
goodwill.”608  The Federal Circuit found that “[t]he lack of such 
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incentives in this case supports the view that a contract was not 
formed.”609  Thus, “[b]ecause the Government lacked the requisite 
intent to enter into a contract with 1st Home regarding the 
accounting treatment of goodwill to be generated by 1st Home’s 
conversion, no contract was formed, and thus, there was no 
breach.”610  The Federal Circuit accordingly reversed the COFC’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of 1st Home and remanded the 
case for the COFC to enter judgment in favor of the Government.611 
C. Slattery v. United States612 
Like the other Winstar cases, Slattery v. United States involved the 
acquisition of a failing thrift by a healthy bank at the behest of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).613  In 1982, the FDIC 
encouraged Meritor Savings Bank to merge with the failing Western 
Savings Fund Society.614  Among the incentives the FDIC gave to 
Meritor to acquire Western was a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) that would allow Meritor to treat Western’s net liabilities as 
“supervisory goodwill” and count that goodwill towards Meritor’s 
regulatory capital requirements, amortized over fifteen years.615  
Though the FDIC had to provide over $294 million in other 
incentives to finalize the merger, it would have cost over $400 million 
more to liquidate FDIC’s deposit insurance liability in the event 
Western failed.616 
Notwithstanding frequent modifications to its regulatory 
requirements in response to the financial landscape in the 1980s,  
the FDIC continued to allow Meritor to use its supervisory goodwill to 
meet regulatory requirements.617  However, the FDIC asked Meritor 
to enter into a new MOU under which Meritor would maintain a 
minimum capital requirement in excess of the regulatory minimum 
of 5.5%, but it withdrew that request.618  Later, the FDIC forced 
Meritor to accept yet another MOU, raising the capital requirement 
to 6.5%.619  This new MOU also required that if Meritor did not satisfy 
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the 6.5% capital requirement by the end of 1988, it would need to 
increase its tangible capital by $200 million and present a five-year 
strategic plan to improve its financial health.620  When Meritor 
subsequently failed to timely satisfy its capital requirement, it was 
forced to sell fifty-four of its branches and enter into yet another 
agreement with the FDIC.621   
Near the end of 1991, after the passage of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) the FDIC 
began to issue new rules to implement FDICIA.622  One of these rules, 
which would take effect on December 19, 1992, interpreted the 
FDICIA to prohibit the inclusion of supervisory goodwill associated 
with mergers with failing institutions as regulatory capital.623   
The final agreement entered between Meritor and the FDIC 
regarding Meritor’s takeover of Western was reached with full 
knowledge of the proposed FDICIA legislation but before the FDIC 
had adopted any new rules.624   
Meritor could not survive under these new regulations and rules, 
and Meritor’s Board of Directors authorized the FDIC to sell the 
bank in October 1992.625  Soon thereafter, the FDIC informed 
Meritor that when its newest regulation took effect on December 19, 
1992, disallowing the supervisory goodwill, Meritor’s capital ratio 
would drop from 7.5% to 0.66% and it would be “critically 
undercapitalized.”626  Two days later, the FDIC revoked Meritor’s 
deposit insurance, causing the Pennsylvania Secretary of Banking to 
immediately seize the bank.627 
Slattery, an individual owner of Meritor stock, brought both a class 
action and a shareholders’ derivative suit in 1993 in the COFC 
alleging that the FDIC breached its 1982 contract in connection with 
Meritor’s merger with Western.628  The COFC dismissed the class 
action suit but allowed the derivative suit to proceed.629  Following a 
five-month trial, the COFC found the Government liable for breach, 
and the Government appealed on multiple grounds, including 
whether the COFC had jurisdiction over the claim.630 
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit first addressed the Government’s 
argument that the COFC lacked jurisdiction over the claim because 
the FDIC is a non-appropriated funds instrumentality (NAFI), “which 
does not receive its monies via congressional appropriation.”631  NAFIs 
are not subject to the Tucker Act or the COFC’s limited 
jurisdiction.632  After thoroughly examining the history of the FDIC 
and its initial appropriations, the Federal Circuit applied the test 
annunciated in AINS, Inc. v. United States633 to determine whether the 
FDIC is a NAFI and affirmed the COFC’s ruling that the FDIC did 
not meet the fourth factor of this test (which requires a clear 
Congressional intent to exclude the FDIC from appropriated 
funds).634  Therefore, the COFC properly exercised jurisdiction over 
Slattery’s claim.635 
Turning to liability, the court affirmed the COFC’s finding that the 
1982 MOU was a legally binding contract with Meritor that the FDIC 
had breached.636  The Federal Circuit also affirmed the COFC’s 
finding that the FDIC had indicated a clear intent to allow Meritor to 
count supervisory goodwill towards its regulatory capital and that this 
concession was material to Meritor’s agreement to take on the failing 
thrift.637   
The COFC had found that the Government had first breached the 
1982 MOU “in 1988 when it effectively ignored Meritor’s right to rely 
on goodwill as capital, deemed the bank to be in a dangerous 
position with respect to capital reserves, and required it to enter into 
the 1988 MOU which raised its total capital requirements.”638   
The COFC also found that the 1988 MOU, which Meritor entered 
into under duress, led directly to the “downward spiral” of the bank 
and forced the sale of its most valuable assets.639  Rejecting all the 
Government’s arguments to the contrary, the Federal Circuit found 
that the COFC committed no clear error in its interpretation of the 
1982 MOU and “affirm[ed] the ruling that the FDIC breached the 
1982 MOU when it required and continued to require Meritor to 
increase its primary capital,” causing Meritor’s downward spiral and 
the sale of its most valuable assets.640 
                                                 
 631. Id. at 808 (internal quotations omitted). 
 632. Id. 
 633. 365 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 634. Slattery, 583 F.3d at 809–12. 
 635. Id. at 812. 
 636. Id. 
 637. Id. 
 638. Id. at 812–13. 
 639. Id. at 813. 
 640. Id. at 813–16. 
  
2010] 2009 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS 1065 
As for damages, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s 
$371,733,059 award on most grounds.641  The Government appealed 
several aspects of the damages award; Slattery cross-appealed, arguing 
that the trial court should have accepted the alternative damages 
theory because the FDIC avoided $696 million in liquidation costs.642 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s award of $276 million in 
“lost value” damages based on Meritor’s market valuation 
immediately prior to the Government’s first breach, which the COFC 
characterized as a form of expectancy damages.643  This valuation was 
based on a complicated damages model presented by Slattery’s 
damages expert, which the COFC accepted.644  On appeal, the 
Government did not challenge the lost value theory, but did 
challenge the calculations and how the amount was reached.645   
The Federal Circuit found none of the Government’s arguments 
persuasive and held that the Government failed to establish any 
offsetting events that would have reduced the damages award.646  The 
Federal Circuit also affirmed the COFC’s use of a “control premium” 
in valuation of the entire bank as a unit, finding that the Government 
had not “shown clear error in the court’s resolution of competing 
expert testimony to rule that lost value is reasonably measured by the 
value of the entire franchise including a control premium.”647 
The Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s decision on two grounds.  
First, the court found “that the trial court erred in awarding both the 
net cost of entering the contract, and the value lost due to the 
breach.”648  While these two grounds of recovery did not technically 
“overlap,” the $67 million in restitution damages was incompatible 
with the lost value award and thus had to be reversed.649  Likewise, 
because the lost value award had been affirmed, the Federal Circuit 
reversed as duplicative the COFC’s award of $28 million in “wounded 
bank” damages—an assessment of the costs Meritor incurred in 
trying to sell major assets in order to comply with the increases in 
capital requirements.650  Finally, the court denied Slattery’s cross 
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appeal for damages equivalent to the savings achieved by the FDIC in 
preventing Western’s liquidation by its merger with Meritor.651 
Judge Gajarsa dissented from the majority’s decision, arguing that 
the FDIC qualifies as a NAFI under Federal Circuit precedent and, 
therefore, the case should have been remanded to the COFC with 
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.652  
D. Republic Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. United States653 
In Republic Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, in an attempt to save 
nearly $30 million, the Government solicited a takeover of two failing 
thrifts:  Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association of Matteson, 
Illinois (“Citizens”) and Fireside Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Cicero, Illinois (“Fireside”).654  Douglas Crocker and 
Robert Bobb won the right to purchase Citizens and Fireside and 
formed Republic Holding Company, Inc. (RHC) to do so, with MCB 
Financial Group, Inc. (MCB) as the holding company’s sole 
shareholder.655  Meadows Resources, Inc. and a voting trust controlled 
by Crocker and Bobb owned MCB equally.656   
On August 30, 1985, RHC purchased Citizens and Fireside and 
merged them together to form Republic Savings Bank F.S.B (RSB).657  
Through various agreements with the Bank Board, the investors 
provided $17 million in capital and the Government contributed an 
additional $3 million to bring RSB’s total capital to $20 million.658  
Under these agreements, Meadows, MCB and RHC—the plaintiffs—
promised to keep RSB’s net worth above certain levels, while the 
Government promised to allow RSB to use the “purchase method” of 
accounting that would permit RSB to apply the goodwill created by 
the transaction to satisfy regulatory capital requirements.659 
When Congress passed FIRREA in 1989, new capital rules 
eventually led to RSB being seized by the Government.660  Despite 
RSB’s compliance with the capital standards outlined in its 
agreement with the Government, the Resolution Trust Corporation 
(RTC) took control of the thrift on June 5, 1992, when RSB could not 
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comply with the new capital standards imposed by the OTS pursuant 
to FIRREA.661  RTC subsequently sold RSB to Regency Savings Bank 
for $926,000—of which only $284,940.71 remained after the 
Government paid administrative fees associated with the 
receivership.662  The FDIC, which at this point was administering the 
receivership, paid the remainder to Meadows as the final distribution 
of the receivership.663 
The plaintiffs—Meadows, MCB, and RHC—brought suit in June 
1992 alleging, among other things, breach of contract based on RSB’s 
inability to count its goodwill towards its capital requirements 
following the passage of FIRREA, and seeking $17 million in 
restitution for its capital contribution and $926,000 in “profit” based 
on what the Government was paid for RSB.664  The COFC granted 
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them 
$14,641,059.29 in damages, consisting of the cash contribution minus 
the $3 million contributed by the Government and the difference 
between the price paid to the Government for RSB and the 
remainder already paid to Meadows.665 
The Government appealed the COFC’s damages award arguing, 
among other things, that the Plaintiffs’ alleged $17 million 
capitalization contribution actually amounted to no more than 
$2.235 million and that it was error for the COFC to award restitution 
based on the $926,000 sale premium.666  Plaintiffs cross appealed, 
arguing that the COFC should not have offset its award by the  
$3 million Government contribution.667 
In denying the Government’s appeal of the $14 million dollar 
restitution award based on the Plaintiffs’ initial pledge contribution 
(as offset by the Government’s $3 million contribution), the court 
rejected all of the Government’s arguments that the COFC had 
overstated the value of the contribution.668  The Government first 
argued that the initial $17 million cash contribution pledged by the 
plaintiffs, consisting of $5 million in equity in Bellamah Community 
Development (a real estate company owned by Meadows and MCB) 
and a $12 million dollar earnings preference on BCD’s future 
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earnings, “were so ephemeral as to be incapable of valuation.”669   
In rejecting this argument, the court found that the contribution the 
Plaintiffs had pledged were “real assets with an objective worth and 
[were] therefore clearly recoverable.”670  The court also rejected the 
Government’s argument that the restitution should be limited to the 
value of the income the assets pledged actually produced, as only 
$2.235 million from the $12 million earnings preference was ever 
collected, finding that the assets needed to be valued at the time of 
contracting.671   
The court did reverse the COFC, however, on the award of 
restitution based on the premium related to the sale of RSB, finding 
that the COFC could not “unwind Plaintiffs’ initial capital 
contributions without also unwinding their claim to RSB’s sale 
premium.”672  The court noted that the Plaintiffs had not, and could 
not tie their efforts in turning the failing thrifts into a profitable 
entity to the sale premium.673  Thus, the court found that “[t]he sale 
premium was not a valid basis for restitution and the court erred by 
including the net sale premium in Plaintiffs’ award.”674 
The court also agreed with the Government that the COFC 
improperly failed to offset the damages award by $4.287 million in 
tax benefits the Plaintiffs received as a result of purchasing the 
thrifts.675  The Plaintiffs did not contest that they had benefited from 
this tax advantage, but argued that it should not reduce their award 
because the benefit did not come directly from any contractual 
requirement.676  The court concluded that while not specifically 
incorporated into the contract, “[t]he tax benefits were not some 
remote consequence of the contract in which the government took 
no part . . . .  [They] were [actually] a crucial motivating force behind 
their willingness to take over the two failing thrifts.”677  Furthermore, 
the Plaintiffs had to specifically request that the Bank Board make a 
special authorization to allow them to take advantage of the tax 
benefits.678  Thus, the court found that “[u]nder these circumstances, 
                                                 
 669. Id. at 1374. 
 670. Id. at 1375. 
 671. Id. 
 672. Id. at 1377. 
 673. Id. 
 674. Id. 
 675. Id.   
 676. Id. at 1378. 
 677. Id.  
 678. Id. 
  
2010] 2009 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS 1069 
we cannot conclude that the government’s actions were irrelevant to 
the tax benefit.”679 
Finally, the court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the trial court 
erred by offsetting their restitution by the $3 million the Government 
had contributed.680  The court reasoned that all the Plaintiffs, 
including RSB (who was the direct beneficiary of the $3 million cash 
contribution), benefited directly or indirectly from the contribution 
and thus should not be allowed to reap this benefit twice through the 
award of restitution damages.681 
E. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States682 
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States arose out of the 
Government’s breach of its numerous contracts with domestic 
nuclear utilities to store high-level nuclear waste (HLW) and SNF.683  
The Plaintiffs, Carolina Power & Light Company and Florida Power 
Corporation, collectively referred to by the court as “Progress 
Energy,” operated five nuclear reactors at four power plants in the 
South.684  Progress Energy had entered into a contract with the 
Department of Energy (DOE) under which DOE was to take title and 
dispose of Progress Energy’s HLW and SNF in exchange for Progress 
Energy paying a one-time charge and quarterly fees.685  This contract 
was one of many “Standard Contract[s]” DOE had entered into with 
various nuclear utilities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.686 
Under the Standard Contract, no fixed rate at which DOE would 
accept and dispose of waste was stated.687  Instead, the DOE was 
required to issue annual capacity reports (ACRs) and annual 
acceptance priority rankings (APRs) to which the utilities were 
required to submit a delivery commitment schedule (DCS) to identify 
the SNF ready for delivery sixty-three months after the DCS 
submission.688  The Federal Circuit has previously referred to this 
process as the acceptance capacity schedule (ACS) process.689 
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Under the contract, DOE was required to begin to take control of 
Progress Energy’s waste no later than January 31, 1998.690  DOE failed 
to do so and as of December 31, 2005, despite Progress Energy paying 
more than $660 million in fees, the DOE had not collected any waste 
from Progress Energy.691  Based on the DOE’s clear breach, Progress 
Energy sued in the Court of Federal Claims where the DOE did not 
dispute liability, only the quantum of damages.692 
The COFC accepted the utilities’ damages model and awarded 
Progress Energy $82,789,289 in damages.693  The main issue in the 
COFC was what acceptance rate should be applied to ascertain the 
actual expenses incurred by Progress Energy because of DOE’s 
breach.694  As noted above, the Standard Contract did not include a 
rate at which DOE would accept and dispose of SNF and HLW.695  
The COFC issued its opinion on June 19, 2008, in which it applied 
the DOE’s 2004 ACR, meaning that it would apply an acceptance rate 
of 3,000 metric tons of uranium (MTUs), as the measure of DOE’s 
performance absent the breach.696  In applying the 2004 ACR as the 
proper standard, the COFC rejected the Government’s theory that 
the 1991 ACS should have been applied, which would have dictated 
an analysis based on an acceptance rate of only 900 MTUs and would 
have resulted in damages of $47,755,006.697  The COFC also awarded 
Progress Energy $4,231,710 in overhead costs, rejecting the 
Government’s argument that these costs were not recoverable 
because they were fixed costs not proximately related to the breach.698  
Less than two months after the COFC’s decision, the Federal Circuit 
issued its opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. United States,699  
in which the court established the June 1987 ACS as the appropriate 
SNF acceptance rate to be applied in determining damages—a rate 
neither party had advocated in Carolina Power.700 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the COFC’s judgment based 
on the precedent in Pacific Gas.701  First, the court explained that it 
did not accept the 1991 ACS as the proper measure of the parties’ 
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intended rate of contractual performance because the 1991 ACS had 
been influenced by “linkage requirements” of the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1987 that had rendered the Government’s 
full performance unlikely.702  Accordingly, the court had previously 
selected the 1987 ACS “as the best metric to gauge the parties’ 
contractual intent” because this rate was developed prior to the 
imposition of the linkage requirements and thus better reflected the 
rate at a time when all parties realistically believed that the DOE 
would accept SNF/HLW on time.703 
The Federal Circuit also rejected the Government’s assertions that 
remand was inappropriate because Progress Energy had waived its 
right to prove damages under the 1987 rates by  not addressing those 
rates at trial, or, alternatively, that Progress Energy should be 
restricted to relying on only the evidence already in the trial record:  
the Government’s evidence related to the 1991 rates.704  The court 
found that it would not penalize Progress Energy for pursuing its 
litigation in good faith and not being able to predict or await the 
outcome of related litigation.705  The court also rejected Progress 
Energy’s argument that remand was unnecessary because the 
difference in the 1987 and 2004 rates was immaterial.706  Because it 
concluded that testing Progress Energy’s theory was a “profoundly 
factual endeavor,” the Federal Circuit determined it was not in a 
position to make factual findings even if it “may well be a matter that 
can be tested by fairly simple arithmetic.”707 
Finally, the court affirmed the COFC’s damages award related to 
overhead and indirect costs Progress Energy incurred as a result of 
DOE’s breach.708  The two costs at issue were “stores overhead,” which 
consisted primarily of warehousing costs and related labor, and 
indirect overhead expenses, which consisted mainly of the salaries of 
managers and financial employees.709  The Federal Circuit affirmed 
the COFC’s holding that Progress Energy should be allowed to 
recover these overhead and indirect costs because the record showed 
that Progress Energy had diverted warehousing and management 
resources to mitigation projects.710  The court also rejected the 
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Government’s assertion that this recovery should be offset by costs 
Progress Energy avoided by not having to load DOE’s “transportation 
casks” upon arrival to accept SNF.711  The Federal Circuit found that 
these costs had only been deferred and not avoided, and that 
eventually Progress Energy would have to pay these costs when DOE 
finally collected SNF in the future.712 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s 2009 Government Contracts opinions reflect 
significant developments in the court’s jurisprudence, particularly 
with respect to (1) bid protests; (2) Government counterclaims 
alleging fraud; (3) contract interpretation; and (4) cost accounting.  
The court’s decisions in each of these areas will have a substantial 
impact on Government Contracts litigation for the foreseeable 
future.     
First, although the number of precedential bid protest opinions is 
noteworthy in and of itself,713 the court’s emphasis on the need for 
judicial restraint and deference to procuring officials will likely 
influence the COFC’s approach to these lawsuits for some time to 
come.  Litigants can expect that the COFC will redouble its efforts to 
avoid “second-guessing” an agency’s procurement decisions and will 
disturb those decisions only where there truly is no rational basis for 
the agency’s actions.714  Moreover, if the COFC decisions issued in the 
first seven months after Axiom are any indication, the Federal Circuit 
likely will address the issue of supplementing the administrative 
record again soon.  Despite the Federal Circuit’s clear direction that 
the contemporaneous record should be supplemented only under 
narrow conditions, COFC judges have continued to liberally permit 
additional material into the record and to rely on those documents in 
their decisions.  It seems only a matter of time before the Federal 
Circuit steps in to re-emphasize that Esch is not the law in the Federal 
Circuit and to re-iterate that APA record review should actually be 
based on the record—not on documents created by the parties after a 
protest is filed.715 
Second, the importance of the court’s decision in Daewoo cannot be 
understated.  Although the facts of that case are unique and not 
likely to be repeated, several “lessons learned” should be considered 
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by any contractor preparing large, complex claims against the 
Government: 
 
• Contractors must understand the CDA’s certification 
requirement and what it means for a claim to be made in 
“good faith.”716  Section 605 of the CDA requires that  
“the amount requested accurately reflects the contract 
adjustment for which [the contractor] believes the 
government is liable.”717 Daewoo underscores the importance 
of identifying the causal connection between entitlement 
and quantum, and avoiding communications that could be 
characterized as a negotiating ploy or “horsetrading.”  
Moreover, section 605 also requires that the “the 
supporting data [be] accurate and complete to the best of 
[the contractor’s] knowledge and belief.”718  Contractors 
must not only get their “facts straight” before submitting 
claims to the Government, but judgmental factors in an 
estimate of claim quantum must be both reasonable and 
consistently applied.   
• Contractors should avoid “total cost/total delay” claims 
unless the facts justify such an approach.  The Federal 
Circuit’s primary criticism of Daewoo’s claim was that it 
improperly “assumed that the government was responsible 
for each day of [delay], without even considering whether 
there was any contractor-caused delay or delay for which 
the government was not responsible.”719  A total cost 
approach is permissible only when (1) it is impracticable to 
prove actual losses directly, (2) the contractor’s bid was 
reasonable, (3) the contractor’s actual costs are reasonable, 
and (4) responsibility for the contractor’s added costs 
belong entirely to the Government.720  Where total 
cost/delay claims (or “modified” total cost/delay claims) 
are pursued, contractors should document their effort to 
identify and adjust for contractor-caused delays and 
inefficiencies.   
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• Contractors should obtain input from outside experts in 
preparing large and/or complex claims.  Although the 
CDA was intended to avoid trial-like processes and  
“to induce resolution of more contract disputes by 
negotiation prior to litigation,”721 the Federal Circuit 
criticized Daewoo for not using outside experts to prepare 
its claim and observed that Daewoo’s trial experts “treated 
the certified claim computation as essentially worthless, did 
not utilize it, and did not even bother to understand it.”722  
Even where good faith/fraud are not at issue, experienced 
counsel and cost experts should be consulted to brainstorm 
approaches to quantum and/or review the claim’s 
calculations.  At the very least, this will avoid situations 
where the contractor must take a different approach to 
quantum in litigation than was taken in the claim. 
  
Third, the Federal Circuit’s “plain meaning” approach to contract 
interpretation will continue to be a source of frustration to litigants 
that base their claims on extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.   
As the court’s decision in Bell BCI shows, the Federal Circuit will 
enforce what it believes is the plain, unambiguous meaning of a 
contract provision, even where the opposing party is unable to 
produce any evidence that it shared that interpretation when it 
executed the contract, or where that plain meaning would contradict 
well-established legal rules—e.g., that a general release does not 
operate to extinguish claims which could not have been known at the 
time the release was executed.723  As it pertains to the interpretation 
of release clauses in particular, Bell BCI may have the unfortunate 
effect of complicating the negotiation of change orders, as 
contractors struggle to comprehend just what they may be giving up 
when they agree to a specific adjustment for a given modification. 
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Finally, contracting parties, the Boards, and the COFC will have 
their work cut out for them applying the two-part test for recovery of 
defense and settlement costs established in Tecom.724  Unquestionably, 
the Federal Circuit faced a serious dilemma in that appeal—on the 
one hand, the Government should not reimburse contractors for 
settling meritorious sexual harassment cases, while on the other 
hand, the Government should not force contractors to defend 
meritless cases and incur allowable costs that exceed the cost of 
settlement.  The Federal Circuit appears to have determined that the 
former goal is paramount, to be accomplished at the expense of the 
latter.   
In practice, Tecom adds several layers of complexity to what 
previously was a pure business decision for government contractors.  
When faced with third-party litigation, the settlement calculus now 
must include the possibility that a future contracting officer will 
determine that the plaintiff had more than a “very little likelihood of 
success on the merits” and disallow the defense and settlement costs.  
As such, many contractors may be inclined to seek pre-approval from 
the contracting officer before settling third-party litigation.  Yet such 
communications likely would require counsel to reveal their 
assessment of the litigation’s merits and could risk jeopardizing 
attorney-client privilege or disclosing attorney work product to the 
government.  In the end, Tecom illustrates why some issues are better 
dealt with through the regulatory process, namely a Federal 
Acquisition Regulation rule-making, which is better equipped to take 
practical ramifications into account to create a framework that both 
protects the government from egregious charges and provides a 
reasonable, predictable standard for contractors. 
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